本研究主要在探討多角化收購下外部董事的產業經驗對於併購的影響。過去文獻指出，多角化公司等複雜度較高的公司對於董事會提供建議的需求較高，其董事會規模較大，董事會成員當中也有較多的外部董事，因此探討多角化收購下，外部董事扮演的角色成為一項重要的議題。本研究假設外部董事擁有目標公司產業經驗時對於收購績效會產生正面的影響，且產業經驗的強度愈高時，對於收購績效的正面影響愈為明顯；此外，本文亦探討外部董事為併購帶來正面價值的方法。實證結果顯示，當外部董事曾經擔任或目前任職於和目標公司產業別相同公司的內部董事時，對於宣告異常報酬會產生正向的影響；外部董事僅擔任相同產業的外部董事時，則無此效果。而外部董事的產業內部董事經驗，對於一日收購溢酬則有負向的影響，顯示外部董事在談判協商的過程中發揮其應有的功能。當我們控制內部董事和CEO相同強度的的產業經驗之後，這樣的結果依然存在。除此之外，當我們改變產業經驗的定義，只考慮目前的經驗或是將產業定義擴展為主要產業與業務部門別產業；或者當我們改變多角化的定義時，這樣正面的影響依然存在。綜合上述，我們發現，外部董事的產業經驗在多角化收購中是重要的，由於不同型態的產業經驗所建立的經驗強度不同，只有產業內部董事經驗在多角化收購當中，才能為公司帶來正面的顯著影響。

Prior studies demonstrate that complex firms, such as diversified firms, have greater advising needs than simple firms. Thus, they tend to have larger boards with more outside directors. This paper focuses on the relationship between outside directors' industry experience and the acquisition performance in diversifying takeovers. I hypothesize that acquirer’s outside directors’ previous experience in the industry of the target firm, have a positive effect on acquisition performance. We find that outside directors' industry experience as executive directors in target industry have positive effects on abnormal announcement returns. We also find that industry-expert outside directors can help acquirer pay a lower premium for the target in negotiation process. The effects of industry-expert outside directors remain after we control for the industry experience of inside directors and the industry experience of CEOs, and change the definition of industry experience or the definition of diversifying takeover. These findings suggest that outside directors with industry experience play an important role in diversifying takeovers. More importantly, only the highly relevant experience, the experience as executive directors in target industry, has the positive effects on acquisition performance.

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