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| 研究生： |
陳安琪 An-Chi Chen |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
競賽理論與廠商績效:台灣上市櫃電子產業之實證研究 Tournament Theory and Firm Preformance : an Empirical Analysis of Electronics Industry of Listed Company in Taiwan |
| 指導教授： |
單驥
San Gee |
| 口試委員: | |
| 學位類別： |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱： |
管理學院 - 產業經濟研究所 Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics |
| 畢業學年度： | 94 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 85 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 競賽理論 、廠商績效 、電子產業 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | tournament theory, firm performance, lectronics industry |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：21 下載：0 |
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競賽理論（tournament theory）是由Lazear及Rosen於1981年提出，此理論是用以說明薪資水準的決定因素；而本文以台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃的電子產業廠商作為研究對象，試圖探討其薪資結構是否符合競賽理論的預期，當競爭人數越多時，薪資差距也會隨之擴大；第二個探討主題則為公司績效表現與薪資差距的關聯性，是否以提高薪資差距的作法來激勵員工彼此競爭之下，是會同樣反應至績效表現上的；此外，尚會觀察研發投入此因素對於電子產業廠商的公司績效是否具有正面助益效果。實證結果顯示，台灣上市櫃電子產業的薪資結構確實符合競賽理論的預期，而此種薪資結構對於公司績效是存在積極正面幫助的。另外，若研究發展投入比重越高，電子業廠商的績效也會隨之提高，二者呈現正向關係。
Tournament Theory is proposed by Lazear and Rosen（1981）to explain the determination of the reward systems. This study using data on the electronics industry of listed company in Taiwan examines the predictions from the theory of tournaments：that the pay differentials will increase with a greater number of tournament participants. The second topic is to explore the effects of pay differentials and R&D expenditure on firm performance. Our empirical results are consistent with the operation of tournaments. The tournament compensation structure and R&D expenditure both have significantly positive increases in firm performance.
陳明園與石雅慧（2004），「高階經理人薪酬－代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究」，臺大管理論叢，第15卷第1期，pp. 131-166。
單驥與吳玉瑩（2004），「台灣管理階層薪資結構：Tournament Theory之實證研究」，管理評論，第23卷第2期，pp. 45-68。
李佳玲（2005），「不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關聯性：競賽理論之驗證」，會計評論，第42期，pp. 23-53。
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Lazear, E. （1989）, “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 97（3）, pp. 561-580.
Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. （1981）, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 89（5）, pp. 841-864.
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Rosen, S. （1986）, “Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments”, American Economic Review, 76（4）, pp. 701-715.
