本研究以2014年至2023年臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本，使用中介效果多元迴歸模型進行分析，探討董監事股權質押行為對企業績效關聯之直接與間接效果。本研究考慮負債代理問題、權益代理問題及盈餘管理行為三個可能之中介變數，進一步分析各類代理問題是否間接影響董監事股權質押行為與企業績效間之關聯。本研究之實證結果顯示：首先，董監事股權質押與企業績效之間存在負向且顯著之「直接效果」，亦即董監事股權質押行為會減少下一年度企業績效表現。本研究接續檢視中介變數在董監事股權質押與企業績效之「間接效果」，結果彙整如下。第一，負債代理或權益代理問題均具有負向顯著的中介效果，顯示董監事股權質押行為會使公司負債比率上升，亦或擴大席次分配權與盈餘分配權之差距，進而損害公司價值。第二，本研究發現盈餘管理行為能提高公司市場價值；但公司董監事進行股權質押行為，反而會抑制公司下一年度盈餘管理行為，亦即進而降低公司市場價值。本研究進一步將樣本分為財務正常與財務危機公司分別進行實證分析，發現前者之實證結果與整體樣本之結果相似，亦即公司若具有董監事股權質押，會減少下一年度之盈餘管理行為，進而降低公司市場價值。相對地，在財務危機公司之實證結果則顯示，公司董監事質押顯著限縮其盈餘管理行為。然而盈餘管理行為並未顯著影響其市場價值，亦即盈餘管理行為在董監事股權質押與企業績效之間則不具間接效果。

This study uses a sample of TWSE listed companies from 2014 to 2023, and employs multiple-regression mediated models to examine the direct and indirect effects of share pledging by directors on corporate performance. Three potential mediators are considered—debt agency problems, equity agency problems, and earnings management —to test whether each channel transmits the impact of share pledging to firm performance. The results of this research are as follows. First, there are a significant negative direct relationship between director share pledges and firm performance, which mean share pledges reduce firm performance in the subsequent year. The study then evaluates potential indirect effect and the results are as follows. Debt agency and equity agency problems both operate as significant negative mediators. Pledging either raises debt ratio or widens the gap between control rights and cash-flow rights, each outcome eroding firm value. Second, Earnings management generally boosts market value; yet once directors pledge shares, firms scale back earnings-management in the following year, which ultimately depresses firm market value. This study further split the sample into non-distressed firms and financially distressed firms. For non-distressed firms, the pattern matches the full sample: pledging curbs next-year earnings management and then reduces market value. For financially distressed firms, pledging still markedly restricts earnings management, but earnings management no longer exerts a significant influence on market value, so no mediation effect arises between director share pledges and firm performance in that group.

中文文獻
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［2］ 高蘭芬, 陳安琳, 陳怡凱和陳烷鈺, 「董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究」, 中山管理評論 21(3), 299-337, 2013.
［3］ 張瑞當, 方俊儒和曾玉琦, 「核心代理問題與盈餘管理」, 管理學報, 24(1), 17-39, 2007.
［4］ 陳烷鈺, 「董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究」, 國立高雄大學金融管理學系, 碩士論文, 2009.
［5］ 顏君如, 「盈餘管理、企業永續績效與公司績效」, 國立臺中科技大學會計資訊系碩士班, 碩士論文, 2022.

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