本研究探討之主題及研究目的，主要針對我國1990年至2016年之台灣上市櫃各產業公司經營權異動，以企業異動後績效成果之公司作為經營權異動樣本，符合因財務困難而造成企業經營權轉移至其他企業進行企業績效研究。並探討經營權異動之決定性因素，及經營權異動對企業績效之影響：從人員精簡、公司治理模式、及控制型態改變三方面進行探討。研究樣本企業共108間公司，126個觀察樣本，主要針對經營權變動前三年及後三年做為研究期間，以此六期間對照之變動，進一步研究與分析「人員精簡」、「公司治理」與「控制型態改變」對經營權異動後之績效影響。實證結果顯示，員工人數減少，造成流動率上升對經營權異動後績效呈現正相關；公司治理對經營績效呈現正相關；家族主導對經營權異動後績效呈現正相關。

The main topics and research purposes of this study are mainly related to the change of management rights of the listed companies in Taiwan from 1990 to 2016, the companies with performance results after changing management rights are used as the samples of change of management rights, and to investigate the organizational performance in compliance with the financial difficulties which caused the management right to transfer to other companies. Also, this study discusses the decisive factors and the impact on the corporate performance while changing the management rights: from the perspective of personnel reduction, corporate governance models, and changes in control patterns (types). This study includes a total of 108 research sample companies and 126 observation samples, and mainly focuses on the period three years before and three years after the change of management rights. The changes of comparison during this sex years are used to further study and analyze “simplification of personnel”, “corporate governance”, and “change in control type” that impact on organizational performance after the change of management rights.
　　The empirical results show that the decrease in the number of employees resulted in a positive correlation between the increase in turnover rate and organizational performance after the change of management rights; corporate governance has a positive correlation with management performance; family-led has a positive correlation with the organizational performance after the change of management rights.

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