通路協調在以前的文章已經被廣泛研究了，以目標為整體供應鏈最大化使得供應商與零售商的利潤也能有所提升，有很多協調合作機制可以使整條供應鏈最大化，而在以前的文章並沒有考慮太多因素，Cachon(2005)提出在簡化的供應鏈模型下，買回合約與營收分享合約的合作機制是無差別的，但現實上許多因素會影響供應鏈的訂購量，其因素有可能是風險、忠誠度、…等眾多因素，使得現實上的模型與簡化的模型結果有所落差。本研究動機為在風險趨避的因素影響下的合作機制，合作機制的合約會受到如何影響。
本研究將探討推式合約之下，供應商提供合作機制合約給風險趨避零售商，我們依據決策者的風險感受來探討合作機制合約。在推式合約之下，供應商提供協調合約給零售商,以達到增加彼此利潤的目的；由於零售商承擔存貨風險，因此零售商對風險的感受會影響其所做的決定。所以當供應商面對風險趨避的零售商時，應該考量其風險態度來訂定決策。本文透過協調機制合約的模型探討兩種風險趨避情況;一是探討當供應商不知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者情形。二是供應商知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者。探討供應商面對風險趨避的零售商，這些誘因機制有何差別，並且探討在這些合作機制下，哪一種誘因機制受風險趨避因素影響較小，較為穩健。

Coordination mechanism for supply chain has been studied in many researches in the past. Their objective are want to supply chain’s profit maximize that increase the supplier’s and retailer’s profits. Many coordination mechanisms were proposed to achieve channel coordination. For example, buy back contract that supplier provide buy back price for retailer unsold product.it can decrease retailer’s risk. Most of coordination mechanisms are discussed based on considering risk-neutral decision makers. In other words, the supplier’s and the retailer’s attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neutral when they making decisions. The study point when the supplier’s and the retailer’s attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neutral that any contract are indifferent. In the fact, the retailer’s decision be affected many factors. These factors have risk, loyal, loss, and so on.
Therefore, we consider their risk preferences into the design of contracts in this study. In a push contract, the retailer to endure all of the inventory risk, and the retailer’s attitude toward risk affects her decision. As a result, it is important for the supplier to consider the opponent’s risk preference. In this study, the supplier provides coordination contract to the risk-averse retailer in order to increase both profits. We analyze three cases. In case 1, the supplier faces the retailer is risk-neutral. In case 2, the supplier does not know the retailer is risk-averse, and in case 3, the supplier knows the retailer is risk-averse. We discuss these three cases in the coordination mechanism contract. Finally, we try to show risk-aversion affect coordination contracts, in other words, which coordination mechanism is more robust.

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