本文觀察線上遊戲市場，針對線上遊戲廠商的收費模式，建立一個線上遊戲定價模型，探討獨占線上遊戲廠商的最適定價策略，並進行相關福利分析。
　　本文研究結果發現，當市場為部份涵蓋時，線上遊戲的單位品質成本下降，道具的開發成本下降或潛在消費者人數增加將導致廠商訂定較高的線上遊戲入場費用，降低道具價格；當市場為完全涵蓋時，如果道具開發成本很低或潛在消費者人數很高，廠商將提高線上遊戲入場費用，並將道具價格降至趨近於0。
　　關於網路效果，本文發現如果市場為部份涵蓋，存在間接網路效果；如果市場為完全涵蓋，則不存在網路效果。在社會福利方面，當市場為部分涵蓋時，廠商制定的線上遊戲最適品質高於極大化社會福利之下的遊戲品質程度；當市場為完全涵蓋時，廠商制定的線上遊戲最適品質則與極大化社會福利之下的遊戲品質程度相同。

This research proposes a model to analyze a firm’s pricing strategy and the related social welfare effect in the monopolistic online game market. In the case that the market is partially-covered, we derive that if the quality cost of the online game decreases, if the development cost of the instrument decreases or if the population of the potential consumers increases, then the firm raises the entry fee and reduces the instrument prices. In the case that the market is fully-covered, the firm sets a higher entry fee and provides the instruments for free if the development cost of the instrument is very low or if the population of potential consumers is large.
Regarding the issue of network effects, we find that indirect network effect exists when the market is partially-covered, and does not exist when the market is fully-covered. Finally, we show that, from the social planer’s point of view, the quality of the online game provided by the monopolistic firm is too high when the market is partially-covered; and is appropriate when the market is fully-covered.

中文部份
[1] 張郁敏、吳唯農與康耕輔，2006，「線上遊戲關係品質與忠誠度之研究」，廣告學研究，第25集，27-53頁。
[2] 傅鏡暉，2003，線上遊戲產業HAPPY書，初版，遠流，台北市。
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英文部份
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