高階經理人薪酬一直以來都是受關注的議題。本篇研究建立在先前的研究基礎上，研究台灣全體上市公司2010~2014年的資料，檢視高階經理人自主裁量權對高階經理人薪酬與組織績效之間關聯的影響，並進一步透過與市場薪酬水準差距比較，了解高階經理人薪酬與市場水準的差異程度是否能影響組織績效的成效。

實證結果顯示：高階經理人薪酬確實受到高階經理人自主裁量權之影響。當高階經理人薪酬在較低水準時，高階經理人薪酬受到董事會良好監控，因此高階經理人會受薪酬之誘因效果影響，組織績效隨薪酬增加而上升；而當薪酬超過一最適薪酬水準後，受高階經理人自主裁量權影響，組織績效隨薪酬增加而下降。另一方面，透過與薪酬水準作比較，當高階經理人獲得高於市場水準之薪酬時，的確會對經理人產生誘因效果並進一步反應在組織績效上；然而，當高階經理人獲得低於市場水準之薪酬時，實證結果與本研究假說預測相反。雖統計結果不顯著，但從其數值來看，卻顯示當薪酬低於市場水準時，組織績效反而隨著高階經理人薪酬與市場水準差距擴大而上升的意義，本研究也提出幾個可能的原因來解釋這樣的現象。

Top management compensation issue has long been concerned. Based on the previous studies, this study used Taiwan’s TWSE listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as research samples to verify the effect of managerial discretion affects the correlation between top management compensation and company’s operating performance. In addition, we derived executive manager's market pay through estimation in order to see the impact of overpay and underpay on company’s performance.

This study suggests that a quadratic relation is obtained between performance and top management compensation. This relation explains a positive effect that driving from top management compensation incentives supported by agency theory on performance at low levels of management compensation, and a negative effect which is consequence of higher managers’ discretion at high levels. Furthermore, when managers’ get overpaid, it indeed has positive effect on company’s future performance. As to the effect of underpay to the company’s future performance, contrast to our hypothesis, although the statistical results are not significant, analyzing the results from the data reveals that underpay also has positive effect on company’s future performance. For this reason, we provides some explanations.

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