本篇研究主要探討集團企業與非集團企業的投資效率差異，透過集團所帶來的正面或負面影響來釐清中國集團企業所扮演的內部資本市場角色，並進一步以所有權結構與關係人交易來解釋並勾勒影響中國集團企業的投資效率的原因。為了避開股改效果與閉鎖期間的影響，本研究以2009年至2013年間的上海與深圳A股上市公司為研究對象進行實證分析。研究結果顯示，集團企業相較於非集團企業有較高的投資效率，說明於中國市場，集團創造的內部資本市場扮演重要的角色。為了進一步探討形成集團企業相較於非集團企業投資效率高的原因，本研究從所有權結構與其使用關係人交易程度高低的角度切入。結果顯示，國有集團企業相較於國有非集團企業有較高的投資效率，而此結果是導因於在同為國有的所有權結構下，集團企業相對於非集團企業使用較低程度的關係人交易。

This research investigates the difference of investment efficiency between business group and non-business group. Through shaping the role of internal capital markets that business groups play, we point out how the ownership structure and related party transactions affect the investment efficiency. In order to avoid the effect of the split-share structure reform and lockup period that will affect the market price when we measure the investment opportunity, the sample we choose includes listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2013. We find that business groups have better investment efficiency than non-business groups, indicating that business groups in China indeed act as an important internal capital market. From the point of view of ownership structure and related party transactions, we find that state-owned business groups have better investment efficiency than state-owned non-business groups, because state-owned business groups use less related party transactions than state-owned non-business groups.

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