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研究生： 李權峰
Chuan-feng Lee
論文名稱： 股權結構與負債比率之實證研究-以中國上市公司為例
The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Debt Ratio–Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
指導教授： 洪榮華
Jung-hua Hung
口試委員:
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 企業管理學系在職專班
Executive Master of Business Administration
畢業學年度： 99
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 33
中文關鍵詞： 負債結構 、機構投資人 、外部董事 、長期負債比率
外文關鍵詞： Long-Term Debt Ratio, Outside Directors, Institutional Investor, Capital Structure
相關次數： 點閱：8  下載：0 
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    • 本研究主要目的為探討中國上市企業的股權結構與負債比率的相關性，樣本取樣於中國2001年到2009年間之上海及深圳的上市企業，從中國國內機構投資人持股比率、外部董事比例、董事會規模、內部人持股比率等因素，與長期負債比率進行分析。本研究發現，中國國內機構投資人持股比率與長期負債比率具有顯著的負相關；外部董事比例與長期負債比率則具有顯著的正相關；而董事會規模與長期負債比率具有顯著的正相關；至於內部人持股比率則與長期負債比率具有顯著的負相關。

    This study examines the relationship between the ownership structure and the debt ratio of Chinese listed firms.We select the Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges ranging from 2001 to 2009 as the sample and proceed with the analysis based on the institutional ownership, the proportion of outside directors, board size, insider ownership and the debt ratio.We find that the ownership of domestic institutions has significantly negative relationship with long-term debt ratio; the proportion of outside directors is significantly and positively associated with long-term debt ratio; as for the insider ownership, it has significantly negative relationship with long-term debt ratio as well.

    目 錄 頁次 中文摘要 ……………………………………………………… i 英文摘要 ……………………………………………………… ii 目錄 …………………………………………………… iii 圖目錄 ……………………………………………………… v 表目錄 ……………………………………………………… vi 壹、 緒論 ……………………………………………………… 1 貳、 文獻探討與假說建立 ………………………………… 3 1 代理問題與負債比率之關係 3 2 機構投資人持股比率與負債比率之關係 ………………….… 4 3 外部董事比例與負債比率之關係 ……………… 6 4 董事會規模與負債比率之關係 ……………… 7 5 內部人持股比率與負債比率之關係 ……………… 8 參、 研究設計與方法 …………………………………………… 10 1 資料來源 …………………………………………… 11 2 變數定義 …………………………………………… 11 3 實證模式 …………………………………………… 14 肆、 實證結果與分析 …………………………………………… 16 1 敘述統計 …………………………………………… 16 2 迴歸分析 …………………………………………… 17 3 穩健性檢定 …………………………………………… 19 伍、 結論 ……………………………………………… 20 1 研究結論 ……………………………………………… 20 2 相關建議 ……………………………………………… 21 3 研究限制及研究建議 …………………………………… 21 參考文獻 ……………………………………………… 22 圖 目 錄 頁次 圖1 論文架構 ………………… 2 圖2 研究架構 ………………… 10 表 目 錄 頁次 表1 變數之定義 ………………… 15 表2 敘述統計結果 ………………… 16 表3 負債比率之迴歸分析 ………………… 18 表4 負債比率之穩健性分析 ………………… 19 表5 結論總表 ………………… 20

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