本研究將以代理理論及競賽理論、薪資分散理論以及公平理論的觀點探討高階經理人與一般員工分紅制度以及兩者差距與公司績效之關聯。本研究與過去國內其他研究最大的相異之處為同時探討高階經理人與一般員工之各別分紅占薪資比例與兩者平均分紅金額之差距，並將產業化分為傳統產業、科技業、服務業以及其他產業做為探討，以更完整的薪酬組合資料分析台灣上市上櫃公司分紅獎酬政策與公司績效之間的關聯。
資料來源主要取自台灣經濟新報資料庫及公開資訊觀測站，以台灣上市上櫃公司2008年至2010年財報資料為研究對象，包含了橫斷面與時間序列的資料整理。研究結果顯示高階經理人分紅占薪資比例、一般員工分紅占薪資比例、高階經理人與一般員工平均分紅差距，三項變數部分對於公司績效有顯著的正向影響，不同產業產生不同程度之影響。就整體而言，結果證實分紅占薪資比例越高，公司績效越好，可見分紅在薪酬中所扮演的重要角色。此外，也證實了競賽理論的觀點，當高階經理人與一般員工的平均分紅差距越大時，越能誘使公司其他員工為了取得更高的工作報酬，進而投入最大的努力。本研究期望能提供公司在實施員工分紅制度時一參考的方向。

The purpose of the study is to discuss the relationship between profit-sharing and firm performance based on the agency theory, the tournament theory, the wage dispersion theory and the equity theory.
The variables of employee compensation and firm performance variables are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) during 2008 to 2010, which is based on the secondary data of all listed companies in Taiwan. We classified companies according to industry, and there are conventional industries, high tech industries, and the others. Results indicate that the ratio of profit sharing to fixed pay for the top managers and employees, and the differentials in profit sharing between top managers and employees have a significantly positive effect on some firm performance. According to the agency theory and the tournament theory, they provided criterions for how to decide wage structures can increase firm performance. Based on our results, we suggest firms should give their top managers more compensation and decide an appropriate wage structure to retain the top management team and motivate their employees to promote their performance hard in the sequential tournaments.

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三、 網站資料
傳統產業加值_創新科技關懷計畫http://tipo.stars.org.tw/Form02.aspx?id=929&N_Kind=%E7%94%A2%E6%A5%AD%E8%A9%95%E6%9E%90