本研究是依據Lazear及Rosen於1981年所提出競賽理論(Tournament Theory)為研究主軸，主要探討公司經理人的薪資差距與公司績效間是否具有正向關係，以及影響公司經理人薪資差距的原因與影響公司績效的主因，並探討何種薪資差距對於公司績效有最大的正向影響。
本研究以2011至2014年中國大陸深圳上市公司作為研究對象，2011年462家公司、2012年468家公司、2013年471家公司、2014年467家公司、四年共計1,868家廠商11,554筆觀察值。並將產業分為傳統產業及其他產業、高科技產業兩大類別，藉由簡單之線性迴歸探討五種薪資差距與公司績效間之關係，利用競賽理論來了解何種薪資差距對公司績效有最大的效用，並分別探究影響公司績效及職級間薪資差距的成因。
就影響職級間薪資差距原因，實證資料顯示公司績效對公司職級間薪資差距有正向顯著效果；經理人教育程度對公司職級間薪資差距有正向顯著效果；公司內競爭程度對公司職級間薪資差距有正向顯著效果；越競爭的產業對公司職級間薪資差距有加大正向效果；公司的人數對公司職級間薪資差距亦有正向的顯著效果。
就影響公司績效原因，實證資料顯示公司職級間薪資差距對公司績效有正向顯著效果；公司員工人數對公司績效有正向顯著效果；公司規模對公司績效亦有正向顯著效果；產業平均每股盈餘對公司績效有正向顯著效果；負債資產比對公司績效有反向顯著效果；研發費用率對公司績效亦有反向顯著效果。
且就五種職級間薪資差距的情況，分別為個別副總與總經理薪資差距、總經理與平均職員薪資差距、個別副總與平均職員薪資差距、平均副總與平均職員薪資差距、總經理與平均副總薪資差距，顯示出當公司加大平均副總與平均職員薪資差距，相較於其他四種職級間薪資差距，會對公司績效產生最大的正向效果。

This research is based on Tournament Theory proposed by Lazear and Rosen in 1981 .We comfirm that Tournament Theory actaully exist in the salary structure of Chinese enterprises. Tournament Theory indicates that the further expanding pay gap in the organization will bring even better corporate performance. Not only do we investigate whether pay gap between company managers has positive influence on Corporate Performance, but also Corporate Performance has positive effect on pay gap between company managers.Futher more, we intend to discover the main factors affecting pay gap between company managers and the main factors having great influnce on Corporate Performance.
In this study, we take Chinese enterprises in Shenzhen stock market from 2011 to 2014 as research objects, and include 462 companies in 2011, 468 companies in 2012, 471 companies in 2013, 467 companies in 2014. We take 1,868 companies including 11,554 observations in four years as research objects. Those observations are divided into traditional industries and high-tech industries.
In this research, we have the five kinds of pay gap between employee, which include the pay gap between individual vice-general-manager and general manager, the pay gap between average employee and general manager, the pay gap between individual vice-general-manager and average employee, the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and average employee, the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and general manager.
We look forward to understanding the relationship between the five kinds of pay gap and corporate performance by simple linear regression method. Respectively, we discover the main factors which affect pay gap between company managers and those which have great effect on corporate performance.
Among mainly affecting pay gap factors, empirical results show that company performance has a positively significant influence on pay gap; the level of inner-company competition has a positively significant effect on pay gap; Those classified to high-tech industries have larger influence on pay gap than those classified to tradotional indusries; The total employee number of a company has a positively significant effect on pay gap.
Among dominantly affecting Corporate Performance factors, empirical results show that pay gap between company managers has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance; The total employee number of a company has a positively significant effect on Corporate Performance; The asset of a company has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance; The total number of a company`s employee has a positively significant effect on Corporate Performance; Average return of asset on industry has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance, but debt-asset ratio and R&D expenses ratio of a company both have negatively significant influence on Corporate Performance.
Finally, empirical results suggest that the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and employee payment has the largest effect on Corporate Performance among all pay gaps.

1. 中文部分
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2. 單驥與吳玉瑩(2004)，「台灣管理階層薪資結構：Tournament Theory之實證研究」，管理評論，第二十三卷第二期，頁 45-68。
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