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研究生： 許祐瑋
Yu-Wei Hsu
論文名稱： HERMES：A Light Weight Method to Simulate a USB Device or Pass a USB Firewall
指導教授： 許富皓
Fu-Hau Hsu
口試委員:
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 資訊電機學院 - 資訊工程學系在職專班
Executive Master of Computer Science & Information Engineering
論文出版年： 2019
畢業學年度： 107
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 47
中文關鍵詞： USB攻擊 、USB防火牆
外文關鍵詞： BadUSB, Human Interface Device
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    • USB 介面已經存在多數電腦硬體平台上，然而大部份認定 USB 裝置的威脅只存 在於 USB 隨身碟上，BadUSB 是一種硬體裝置，通過 USB 介面孔，插入目標電腦或其 他裝置，模擬成 HID 介面，進行執行攻擊程式碼或干擾，達到控制主機和資訊洩漏， 目前阻擋 BadUSB 攻擊的方法，以黑白名單防火牆較為常見，利用 USB 的功能特徵和 訊息進行判別，以達到阻擋效果。
    目前存在低成本單晶片 BadUSB 的平台，如 Rubber ducky , Teensy USB 和 Arduino 等等，無法同時模擬儲存裝置和鍵盤，同時也無法把 USB 的資訊個做更底層 的偽冒，讓 USB firewall 可以利用此特點做攔截。因此在本篇論文中我們將發展出可 以穿透目前 USB firewall 的 BadUSB，此 BadUSB 可以做更低階偽冒，模擬同一個 USB 裝置同時存在多個 USB 功能，並使用認證機制來檢驗 HID 攻擊。

    The USB interface already exists on most computer hardware platforms. However, most of the threats of the USB devices are only found on USB flash devices. BadUSB is a hardware device that plugs into a target computer or other device through a USB interface and simulates HID. The interface, to execute the attack code or interference, to achieve control host and information leakage, currently blocking the BadUSB attack method, black and white list firewall is more common, using USB features and messages to determine the blocking effect.
    There are currently low-cost single-chip BadUSB platforms, such as Rubber ducky, Teensy USB and Arduino, etc., it cannot simulate simultaneous simulation of USB information, so that USB firewall can use this features to do interception. Therefore, in this paper, we will develop BadUSB that can pass current USB firewalls, This BadUSB can do lower-level faking, simulate multiple USB functions at the same time with the same USB device, and use the authentication mechanism to verify HID attacks.

    中文摘要 vi Abstract vii 誌謝 viii Contents ix List of Figures xi List of Tables xiv Chapter 1. Introduction 1 Chapter 2. Background 3 2.1. USB Protocol 3 2.2. USB OTG 4 2.3. Linux gadget module 4 2.4. UEvent 6 2.5. HID Attack 6 Chapter 3. Related Work 8 3.1. USBFilter 8 3.2. USBGuard 9 3.3. Rubber Ducky 10 Chapter 4. System Design 11 4.1. Components in HERMES 12 4.2. HERMES Work Flow 17 4.3. Components in USBAuth 19 4.4. USBAuth Work Flow 20 Chapter 5. Evaluation 22 5.1. Environment 22 5.2. USBFilter and USBGuard 23 5.3. HERMES Pass USBFilter 25 5.4. HERMES Pass USBGuard 27 5.5. USBAuth with HERMES 29 Chapter 6. Discussion 30 6.1. Comparison 30 6.2. Limitation 31 6.3. Future Work 31 Chapter 7. Conclusion 32 Reference 32

    [1] Dave (Jing) Tian, Nolen Scaif, Kevin R. B. Butler, Patrick Traynor, “Making USB Great Again with USBFILTER”, USENIX Security Symposium, 2016
    https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_p aper_tian.pdf
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    https://srlabs.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SRLabs-BadUSB-Pacsec- v2.pdf
    [3] Grant Hernandez, Farhaan Fowze, Dave Tian, Tuba Yavuz, Kevin Butler, “FirmUSB Vetting USB Device Firmware using Domain Informed Symbolic Execution”, ACM CCS’17, November, 2017, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09114.pdf
    [4] USBGuard[Online]. Available
    https://usbguard.github.io/
    [5] Rubber Ducky[Online]. Available
    https://shop.hak5.org/products/usb-rubber-ducky-deluxe
    [6] P4wnP1 [Online]. Available
    https://github.com/mame82/P4wnP1
    [7] 深入淺出 Raspberry Pi GPIO[Online]. Available https://www.slideshare.net/raspberrypi-tw/raspberry-pigpiolookinside
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    [9] Joathan Corbet, Alessandro Rubini, GregKroah-Hartman, “Linux Device Drivers, 3e”
    http://www2.electron.frba.utn.edu.ar/~gjoyuela/archivos/linux/ldd3.pdf
    [10] Psychson [Online]. Available:
    https://github.com/brandonlw/Psychson

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