不論國內外，高階管理階層薪酬給予皆受到關注，對於超額報酬的研究多由薪酬委員會品質影響出發，而薪酬委員會本為董事會的功能性委員會，董事會具有其提案決議權，故進而探討董事會組成是否對於高階管理階層薪酬亦具有影響。
本研究以台灣上市櫃電子相關產業公司為研究樣本，擷取台灣新報資料庫(TEJ)2018年度資料，從董事會組成及獨立董事背景切入，探討董事會獨立性與高階管理層薪酬的關聯性。研究結果顯示，獨立董事人數較多的董事會，傾向透過誘因薪酬提高高階管理階層薪酬與企業營運績效的連結，而法務背景的獨董對於高階管理階層與員工薪酬比較的公平性較為在意，學術單位背景的獨董則對於高階管理階層年度酬金總額較為在意，但對於酬金給予的影響及控制行為不明顯。

Regardless of Taiwan or other countries, executive pay is getting attention. The research on excess compensation is mostly based on compensation committee quality. The compensation committee was originally a functional committee of the board of directors, and the board of directors has the right to make resolutions. Therefore, it further explores whether the composition of the board of directors also affects the executive pay.
This research takes Taiwan listed and over-the-counter (OTC) electronics-related industry companies as a research sample. Research from the background of board composition and independent directors and discussing the relationship between board independence and excess compensation. The research results show that the board of directors with a large number of independent directors tends to increase the link between the executive and the operating performance of the company through incentives pay. Independent directors with a legal background are more concerned about the fairness of the salary comparison between the executive and the employees. Independent directors working in academic units are more concerned about the total annual remuneration of the executive, however, their influence on remuneration and control behavior is not obvious.

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