跳到主要內容

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

回結果列表
研究生： 徐聖堯
Sheng-yao Hsu
論文名稱： 總經理替換率-績效敏感度關連性之研究
The Association between CEO Turnover and Firm Performance
指導教授： 曹壽民
Shou-Min Tsao
口試委員:
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 企業管理學系在職專班
Executive Master of Business Administration
論文出版年： 2012
畢業學年度： 98
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 50
中文關鍵詞： 總經理替換 、家族企業 、強制揭露獎酬
外文關鍵詞： Mandated compensation disclosure, Family firms, CEO turnover
相關次數： 點閱：11  下載：0 
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報

    • 本文欲檢視我國金管會於民國95年修正年報董監事得分人分項揭露薪酬的規定，改為依薪資級距公告後，調查國內上市公司後發現總經理替換率-績效敏感度較修正公告前小。其中非家族企業下降比較家族企業雇用外部總經理者多、家族企業中家族成員擔任總經理之企業下降比也較家族雇用外部總經理者多。本研究提供證據顯示法律對於薪酬揭露的管制越嚴格，總經理的表現越能與公司績效相連結。

    In 2006, the Financial Supervisory Commission amended articles of “Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies”. It reduced the quality of mandated compensation disclosure. This study investigates the impact of mandated compensation disclosure on firms'' CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity become less than before, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure. Moreover, we also examine how the decrease of CEO turnover-performance sen-sitivity varies across three types of firms – family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms. The empirical findings are consistent with the decrease of CEO turno-ver-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms and non-family firms than for pro-fessional CEO family firms, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure.

    中文摘要 i 英文摘要 ii 表 目 錄 iv 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 動機與目的 1 第二節 研究問題 4 第三節 本文貢獻 5 第四節 本文結構 5 第二章 文獻探討 6 第一節 公司治理與依法揭露薪酬 6 第二節 總經理替換率、總經理獎酬與公司績效敏感度 8 第三節 代理問題與家族企業 10 第三章 假說發展 12 第一節 法律揭露薪酬約束力下降對替換率-績效敏感度的影響 12 第二節 替換率-績效敏感度在不同家族企業所造成的差異 12 第四章 研究方法 14 第一節 實證模型 14 第二節 資料來源 16 第五章 實證研究 18 第一節 敘述性統計與相關分析 18 第二節 實證結果 20 第三節 其他測試 23 第六章 結論與建議 25 第一節 研究結論 25 第二節 研究限制與後續建議 26 參考文獻 27

    Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301 - 1328.
    Berle, A., Means, G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, NY.: Harcourt, Brace, & World.
    Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. J. (1994). Corporate voting: Evi-dence from charter amendment proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1(1), 5 - 31.
    Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. (2002). Top Management Team Com-pensation: The Missing Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance? Strategic Management Journal, 23(4), 367 - 375.
    Chen, T. (2005). CEO compensation contract of family firms. Working paper, The University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas.
    Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Dai, Z. (2007). Are US Family Firms Subject to Agency Problems? Evidence from CEO Turnover and Firm Valuation. Working paper, Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=930824.
    Cheng, S., & Firth, M. (2005). Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong. Corporate Governance, 13(2), 291-302.
    Coulton, J. J., Taylor, S. L., & James, C. (2001). The Effect of Compensation Design and Corporate Governance on the Transparency of CEO Compensation Dis-closures Working paper. University of Technology, Sydney.
    Craighead, J. A., Magnan, M. L., & Thorne, L. (2004). The Impact of Man-dated Disclosure on Performance-Based CEO Compensation. Contemporary Ac-counting Research, 21(2), 369-398.
    Dahya, J., Lonie, A. A., & Power, D. M. (1998). Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms. Journal of Busi-ness Finance Accounting, 25(9-10), 1089-1118.
    Defond, M., & Hung, M. (2004). Investor protection and corporate governance: Evidence from worldwide CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 269-312.
    Denis, D. K., Denis, D., & Sarin, A. (1997). Ownership structure and top ex-ecutive turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 2(45), 194-221.
    Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
    Farrell, K. A., & Whidbee, D. A. (2003). Impact of firm performance expecta-tions on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Eco-nomics, 36(1-3), 165-196.
    Gibson, M. S. (2003). Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Mar-kets? The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 231 - 250.
    Holderness, C. (2003). A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control. Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 51-64.
    Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74 - 91.
    Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal Monitoring Me-chanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2265 - 2297.
    Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial be-havior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
    Leker, J., & Salomo, S. (2000). CEO turnover and corporate performance. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), 287-303.
    Oviatt, B. M. (1988). Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Man-ager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for Con... more. The Academy of Manage-ment Review, 13(2), 214 - 225.
    Parrino, R., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Voting with their feet: institu-tional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Eco-nomics, 68(1), 3-46.
    Robert, N., & Voetmann, T. (2005). Top executive turnovers: Separating deci-sion and control rights. Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(1), 25-37.
    Skinner, D. J. (1994). Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(1), 38 - 60.
    Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-417.
    Wang, D. (2006). Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 619-656.
    Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988). Stock prices and top management changes. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1-2), 461 - 492.
    Weisbach, M. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Finan-cial Economics, 20(1-2), 431-460.
    Zeckhauser, R. J., & Pound, J. (1990). Are Large Shareholders Effective Mon-itors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance. In R. G. Hubbard, Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment (pp. 149-180). National Bureau of Economic Research.
    伍忠賢. (2003). 公司治理的第一本書. 台北市: 商周出版.
    侯佩秀, 張瑞當, 林國欽, & 沈文華. (2007). 高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響. 會計與公司治理, 4(1), 57-84.
    劉佩修. (2004). 大老闆薪水現形記. 商業周刊第874期, 92-102. 台北市.
    劉紹樑. (2002). 從莊子到安隆A+公司治理. 台北市: 天下雜誌.
    吳修辰. (2005). 小股東看不見大老闆薪資條. 商業周刊第919期, 70-76. 台北市.
    張秀玉. (2002). 股權結構對盈餘資訊內涵之影響.
    林哲良. (2006). 誰管貪財大老闆. 今周刊, 48-56. 台北市.
    林致平. (2009). 美國、日本及香港對掛牌公司監理制度與實務之研究. 證券櫃檯月刊, 143, 92-96.
    歐陽豪;莊雙喜. (2007). 公司治理、相對績效與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究. 亞太經濟管理評論, 11(1), 53-86.
    胡鈞婷. (2006). 獨立董事.公司績效與董監酬勞之關聯. 碩士論文. 國立臺灣大學會計學研究所.
    葉冠妏. (2007). 從公司治理角度論資訊公開. 資誠會計師事務所. Re-trieved from http://www.pwc.com/tw/zh/challenges/corporate-governance/indissue0275.jhtml.
    葉銀華, 柯承恩, & 李存修. (0200). 公司治理與評等系統. 台北市: 商智文化.
    薛明玲. (2003). 由沙氏法案談我國會計監理制度. 薛明玲會計師的財經部落格. Retrieved from http://www.alberthsueh.com/index.php?load=read&id=60.
    陳俊合. (2009). 未費用化薪酬與超額薪酬對高階管理當局薪酬揭露之影響. Working paper. 國立中興大學會計學系.
    黃茵妤. (2008). 從家族企業探討創新活動行為. 碩士論文. 國立中央大學企業管理學系.
    林穎芬, 祝道松, & 洪晨桓. (2006). 經濟附加價值與總經理更替之探討. 當代會計, 7(1), 103-134. 當代會計.

    QR CODE
    :::