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研究生: 陳品宏
Ping-Hung Chen
論文名稱: 家族企業與經理人短視近利問題探討
Family Firms and CEO Career Horizon problems
指導教授: 曹壽民
Shou-Min Tsao
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理學系
Department of Business Administration
論文出版年: 2017
畢業學年度: 105
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 54
中文關鍵詞: 家族企業社會情感財富經理人短視近利問題
外文關鍵詞: family firms, socioemotional wealth, CEO career horizon problems
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  • 以往企業都會因為所有權與經營權分離,股東與經理人目的不同,而有代理問題
    產生,本研究主要探討的議題:經理人短視近利問題(CEO career horizon problem)
    也是代理問題的一類,本研究使用社會情感財富(Socioemotional Wealth,簡稱 SEW)
    為架構去探討企業是否會為了保護 SEW 而減少經理人短視近利問題的發生?除此之
    外,本研究也根據家族企業成立過程,把家族企業成立過程分為兩類,一種是由家族
    成員自己創立,另一種是併購其它企業的家族企業,最後,本研究探討家族企業中第
    幾代經營領導的家族企業績效會較好,研究發現,原創的家族企業和第一代經營者領
    導的家族企業績效會較好。


    In the past , there are agency problems , because of separation of ownership and
    management . the main topics in this study: CEO career horizon problem is also a kind of
    agency problems . This research use socioemotional wealth as theoretical framework to consider
    that whether firms will reduce the CEO career horizon problems in order to protect SEW .
    Besides , this study also explores the establishment of family business process . The establishment
    of family firm is divided into two cases, one is created by the family members themselves, the
    other is the family firm which acquired by families . Finally , this study explores what generations
    in the family firms will lead to a better performance . The study found that there are better
    performance in original family firms and the family firms which lead by first generation .

    目錄 摘要 ..................................................................... i Abstract ................................................................ ii 目錄 ................................................................... iii 表目錄 .................................................................. iv 第一章 緒論 .............................................................. 1 1-1 研究動機與目的.................................................... 1 1-2 研究貢獻.......................................................... 3 第二章 文獻探討 .......................................................... 4 2-1 家族企業.......................................................... 4 2-2 家族企業與代理問題................................................ 5 2-3 家族企業與經理人短視近利問題(CEO career horizon problem) .......... 7 2-4 家族企業與社會情感財富(SEW) ....................................... 8 第三章 假說發展 ......................................................... 11 第四章 研究方法 ......................................................... 14 4-1 研究期間與資料來源............................................... 14 4-2 實證模型與變數定義............................................... 14 第五章:實證結果 ........................................................ 20 5-1 敘述性統計與相關分析............................................. 20 5-2 迴歸分析......................................................... 28 第六章:結論與建議 ...................................................... 39 6-1 研究結論......................................................... 39 6-2 研究限制與建議................................................... 41 參考文獻: .............................................................. 42

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