企業在從創業、業務的運作，技術的研發與產品的創新，皆需要充沛的資金，而資金的籌措會隨著企業成長階段的不同而不同。因此，企業的資金是否充裕，籌措資金的方式與信用是否可行與有效，不但影響企業經營與成長，也會影響其財務結構。
在企業的資金來源中，又以金融機構為主要的提供資金者。在過去，國內的文獻中，對於金融機構與企業的關係，多數以借款作為研究的範圍，甚少討論以金融機構持股的觀點，來分析金融機構投資我國企業之關係。但隨著金融市場的開放與金融體制的改革，金融機構不在單純只扮演債權人的角色，更是從權益投資的角色來協助企業發展。因此，本研究中，將要討論的金融機構分成創業投資事業，投資銀行（交通銀行與中華開發工業銀行）與其他商業銀行三方面，藉以瞭解我國企業籌資與金融機構持股之關係。
本研究將會探討企業成長階段（育成、成長、擴張及成熟時期）與籌資市場之關係，以及在各成長階段，提供企業資金的金融機構與企業之互動關係為探討的出發點，而以台灣歷年的上市公司為實證的對象，瞭解我金融機構投資在企業的上市年度以及產業別是否有所差異；並比較金融機構擔任企業董監事之進入時點與退出時點之分析；再以Probit Model，分析我國上市公司有何特性以吸引金融機構投資並擔任企業之董監事。
結果發現以創業投資機構與投資銀行擔任董監事，家數較多，且集中在近十年IPO上市的電子類公司，在其他銀行方面則集中在金融類股，並且在早期投資的公司產業別較豐富多屬與較傳統的產業。在介入與退出公司董事會時點方面，發現創業投資機構較投資銀行與其他銀行，退出被投資公司董監事會的比率為高，並且在投資銀行與其他銀行則是擔任公司之董監事的期間較長。在分析我國上市公司有何特性以吸引金融機構投資並擔任企業之董監事部份，發現在不分金融機構類別上，只有價格淨值比成顯著的正向關係。而就以創業投資事業而言，則是資產規模成顯著正向關係。在投資銀行方面，以價格淨值比成顯著的正向關係，價格淨值比越高，越吸引金融機構投資並擔任其董監事的機率越高。

Enterprises need plentiful fund to operate the business, to expend the scale, and to innovate new products or technologies. So, how to raise fund is the important subject to enterprises. This thesis describes four phases (incubating phase, growing phase, expanding phase and restructuring phase) during an enterprise life cycle, the theoretical background for optimal financing strategies in each phase, and optimal relationship between enterprise and financial institution changes during different phases.
This thesis examines the relationship between fund resource of enterprise and financial institution and the corporate governance structure of IPO companies in Taiwan. There are three main aspects to investigate: (1) the relationship between the timing, the industry of firms’ IPO and investment of financial institutions, (2) an compare about the time of entering and exiting the board of directors of financial institutions, (3) an analysis about characters of IPO firms to be attracted by financial institutions and to control the company.

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