本研究主要探討股權分置改革前後公司治理與企業績效間的關係，因此選定上海與深圳A股2001-2009年655家上市公司為研究對象，利用公司治理變數，包括：董事會規模、外部董事比例、董事長兼任經理人、機構人持股、內部人持股、國家持股等進行分析，並以Tobin’s Q為績效衡量指標，藉以瞭解公司治理制度之良莠是否攸關企業價值。
實證研究採Panel Data效果模型進行迴歸分析，結果顯示，股權分置改革對於外部董事比例、機構人持股、內部人持股與國家持股比例在企業績效的表現上有不同程度的顯著影響─股權分置改革實施後對董事會規模呈現負向影響，對於外部董事比例呈現正向，對於機構人持股比例呈現負向影響，對於內部人持股比例呈現正向的影響，至於對國家持股比例，則呈現負向影響。但是在董事長兼任經理人的部分並無顯著影響，表示對企業績效的表現影響不大。

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance on firm performance following the Split Share Structure Reform in China. The sample consists of the A-share of 655 listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 2001 to 2009.
Panel data analysis and multiple regression analysis are used to evaluate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance following the Split Share Structure Reform. The empirical results show that, following split share structure reform, the percentage of outside directors and inside ownership have positive effects on firm performance, however, board size, domestic institutions ownership and state ownership have negative effects on firm performance.

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