本研究探討中國國有企業與非國有企業在經營上是否存在差異，分析股權結構與董事會特性對其績效和價值之關係，期能對研究國有企業之領域提供更為完整之證據。實證結果顯示，中國國有企業表現顯著不如非國有企業，原因在於中國國有企業面臨較為複雜的代理問題，受利益掠奪(entrenchment effect)的負面影響大於利益一致(alignment effect)之正面效果。另以董事會特性做為控制變數探討其對中國國有企業經營之影響時，發現在董事會中安排較高比例的獨立董事並無助於公司績效之提升，而由董事長兼任總經理(CEO duality)，亦會對公司績效產生負面影響並損害其價值。

Existing studies have failed to reach the consistent conclusion about the differences in performance between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. A sample of Chinese listed firms is used in this study, providing evidence related to the accounting and market performance of Chinese SOEs. We find that in China non-SOEs perform significantly better than SOEs. In addition, the Chinese SOEs have more complex agency problems and the entrenchment effect seems to dominate the alignment effect for these firms. The findings also suggest that board characteristics including independent directors and CEO duality are detrimental to the performance of the Chinese SOEs.

﹝1﹞Agrawal, A. and Mandelker, G. (1990), “Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: the case of antitakeover charter amendments”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, pp. 143-161.
﹝2﹞Agrawal, A. and Mandelker, G. (2001), “Do some outside directors play a political role?”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 44, No, 1, pp. 179-198.
﹝3﹞Aharony, J., Wang, J. and Yuan, H. (2010), “Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 1-26.
﹝4﹞Ali, A., Chen, T. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007), “Corporate disclosures by family firms”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 238-286.
﹝5﹞Baysinger, B. and Butler, H. (1985), “Corporate governance and the board of directors: performance effects of changes in board composition”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 101-125.
﹝6﹞Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The modern corporation and private property, Macmillan, New York.
﹝7﹞Boardman, A. and Vining, A. (1989), “Ownership and performance in competitive environments: a comparison of the performance of private, mixed and state-owned enterprises”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1-33.
﹝8﹞Brickley, J., Coles, J. and Jarrell, G. (1997), “Leadership structure: separating the CEO and chairman of the board”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 3, pp. 189-220.
﹝9﹞Cao, J., Pan, X. and Tian, G. (2011), “Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 541-554.
﹝10﹞Chen, G., Firth, M. and Rui, O. (2006), “Have China's enterprise reforms led to improved efficiency and profitability ? ”, Emerging Markets Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 82-109.
﹝11﹞Chen, G., Firth, M. and Xu, L. (2009), “Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 33, pp. 171-181.
﹝12﹞Chen, J, Liu, X. and Li, W. (2010), “The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese executive compensation”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 107-123.
﹝13﹞Chen, P., Chang, H. and Liao, C. (2011), “The valuation and strategy of foreign operations under stochastic price: a real options model”, Journal of Testing and Evaluation, Vol. 39, No.6, pp.1174-1188.
﹝14﹞Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S. and Wu, D. (2011), “Government intervention and investment efficiency: evidence from China”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.17, pp. 259-271.
﹝15﹞Cheng, S. (2008), “Board size and the variability of corporate performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 157-176.
﹝16﹞Choi, S., Lee, S. and Williams, C. (2011), “Ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy: evidence from China”, Research Policy, Vol. 40, pp. 441-452.
﹝17﹞Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. and Lang, H. (2002), “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings”, Journal of Finance, Vol.57, No. 6, pp. 2741-2771.
﹝18﹞Claessens, S., Feijen, E. and Laeven, L. (2008), “Political connections and preferential access to finance: the role of campaign contributions”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 88, pp. 554-580.
﹝19﹞Clarke, D. (2003), “Corporate governance in China: an overview”, China Economic Review, Vol. 14, pp. 494-507.
﹝20﹞Dalton, D. and Daily, C. (1999), “Directors and shareholders as equity partners? “Handle with care! ” Compensation and Benefits Review, Vol. 31, pp.73-79.
﹝21﹞Donaldson, L. and Davis, J. (1994), “Boards and company performance - research challenges the conventional wisdom”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 151-160.
﹝22﹞Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M. (1998), “Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 35-54.
﹝23﹞Faccio, M. and Lang, L. (2002), “The ultimate ownership of western European corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 365-395.
﹝24﹞Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-325.
﹝25﹞Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1985), “Organizational forms and investment decisions”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 101-119.
﹝26﹞Finkelstein, S. and Aveni, R. (1994), “CEO duality as a double-edged sword: how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command”, Academy Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 1079-1108.
﹝27﹞Firth, M., Fung, P. and Rui, O. (2007), “How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China’s listed firms”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60, pp. 776-785.
﹝28﹞Fisman, R. (2001), “Estimating the value of political connections”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1095-1102.
﹝29﹞Greene , W. (1993), Econometric analysis, Macmillan, New York.
﹝30﹞Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1980), “Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 42-64.
﹝31﹞Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. (1988), “The determinants of board composition.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 589-606.
﹝32﹞Hsiao, C. (1986), Analysis of panel data, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
﹝33﹞Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.
﹝34﹞Jian, M. and Wong, T. (2010), “Propping through related party transactions”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 70-105.
﹝35﹞Johnson, S. and Mitton, T. (2003), “Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 351-382.
﹝36﹞La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1998), “Law and finance”, Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1113-1155.
﹝37﹞La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate ownership around the world”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 471-517.
﹝38﹞Le, T. and Buck, T. (2011), “State ownership and listed firm performance: a universally negative governance relationship?”, J Manag Gov, Vol. 15, pp. 227-248.
﹝39﹞Lee, L. , Fan, C., Hung, H. and Ling, Y. (2010), “Analysis of financial distress prediction models”, Journal of Testing and Evaluation, Vol. 38, No.5, pp. 1520-1538.
﹝40﹞Lee, M. and Wu, T. (2012), “An integral predictive model off financial distress”, Journal of Testing and Evaluation, Vol. 40, No.6, pp. 931-938.
﹝41﹞Lin, C. and Tsai, M. (2010), “Evaluating the optimal city in south China for new medical facilities: The application modified Porter’s diamond framework”, Journal of Testing and Evaluation, Vol. 38, No.4, pp.1025-1055.
﹝42﹞Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J. (1992), “A modest proposal for improved corporate governance”, Business Lawyer, Vol. 48, pp. 59-77.
﹝43﹞Ma, S., Naughton, T. and Tian, G. (2010), “Ownership and ownership concentration: which is important in determining the performance of China’s listed firms?”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 871-897.
﹝44﹞Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (2003), The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective, Harper and Row, New York.
﹝45﹞Pi, L. and Timme, S. (1993), “Corporate control and bank efficiency”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, No. 23, pp. 515-530.
﹝46﹞Rawlings, J., Pantula, S. and Dickey, D. (1998), Applied regression analysis: a research tool, Springer, New York.
﹝47﹞Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J. (1990), “Outside directors, board independence and shareholder wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26, pp.175-191.
﹝48﹞Shleifer, A. (1998), “State versus private ownership”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 133-150.
﹝49﹞Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986), “Large shareholders and corporate control”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 461-488.
﹝50﹞Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 737-783.
﹝51﹞Sah, R. and Stiglitz, J. (1991), “The quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized organizations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 289-295.
﹝52﹞Tan, J. and Peng, M. (2003), “Organizational slack and firm performance during economic transitions: two studies from an emerging economy”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 1249-1263.
﹝53﹞Uzun, H., Szewczyk, S. and Varma, R. (2004), “Board composition and corporate fraud”, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, pp. 33-43.
﹝54﹞Wei, Z., Xie, F. and Zhang, S. (2005), “Ownership structure and firm value in China’s privatized firms: 1991-2001”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 87-108.
﹝55﹞Westphal, J. and Zajac, E. (1995), “Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity and new director selection”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 40, pp. 60-83.
﹝56﹞Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 185-211.
﹝57﹞Yoshikawa, T. and McGuire, J. (2008), “Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance”, Asia Pac J Manag, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 5-24.