在高技能勞工日益受到重視、資本密集型產業快速發展的背景下，儲蓄及資本累積都受到影響。本論文探討學歷通膨與薪資溢酬現象對勞動市場分化及資本存量的影響，將異質性勞工納入兩期疊代模型，分析資本與技術的互補性下，競爭均衡人均資本存量與黃金法則人均資本存量的關係。

研究結果顯示，競爭均衡人均資本存量隨高技術勞工比例變化呈現先上升後下降的趨勢，主要受到薪資率變動及勞動所得的比例與價格效果交互作用影響。當前競爭均衡下的人均資本存量遠低於黃金法則人均資本存量，若政府欲透過租稅制度使競爭均衡下的人均資本存量靠近黃金法則人均資本存量，應採取「對資本補貼及對老年人課稅」的方式，儘管如此，僅考慮資本稅及定額稅，無法在現在的條件下達成政府的目標，政府應考慮其他如消費稅等租稅。

Against the backdrop of the growing importance of high-skilled workers and the rapid develop
ment of capital-intensive industries, both savings and capital accumulation are affected. This study
examines how educational inflation and wage premiums contribute to labor market polarization and
changes in capital accumulation. A two-period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous
workers is employed to analyze the relationship between the competitive equilibrium level of per
capita capital and its Golden Rule benchmark, under the assumption of capital-skill complemen
tarity.
The results indicate that the competitive equilibrium per capita capital stock exhibits an
inverted-U pattern as the share of high-skilled labor increases. This pattern is primarily driven by
the interaction between changes in the wage rate, the labor income share, and price effects. The
current level of per capita capital under competitive equilibrium remains substantially below the
Golden Rule benchmark.
If the government aims to bring the competitive equilibrium level closer to the Golden Rule
level through tax policy, it should adopt a combination of capital subsidies and taxation on the
elderly. Nevertheless, under the current framework, where only capital taxes and lump-sum taxes
are considered—this policy goal cannot be achieved. Therefore, alternative tax instruments, such
as consumption taxes, should be taken into account.

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