隨著產品種類的增加與消費者意識抬頭，消費者的退貨政策現今無處不在，許多消費者已經習慣將不想要的商品退回給店家其中並不需要任何理由。所以考慮消費者退貨政策之下的供應鏈協調機制也逐漸受到重視。而供應鏈通路協調的議題已經在許多論文中被廣泛的探討以及應用，其目的為達成整體供應鏈的利潤最大化，使得供應商與零售商雙方的利潤都會比沒有進行通路協調時來的大。
本文使用BuyBack合約與Revenue and Risk Sharing合約來達成供應鏈的通路協調。不同於傳統的合約，在消費者退貨政策中，BuyBack合約我們考慮退還品項成本及殘值；而Revenue and Risk Sharing合約與一般營收分享合約不一樣的部份在於我們考慮供應商一起共同承擔零售商之風險。在研究中，我們假設供應商及零售商各一位，在零售商推出顧客退貨政策的情況下，藉由供應鏈中不同的協調機制來探討供應商與零售商分別在不合作以及合作下的利潤。由結果可以觀察到，如果供應商與零售商不單只考慮自身利益，而是透過通路協調機制來合作，則可以使得整體供應鏈的利潤最大化以及達到增加彼此利潤的目的，達成雙贏局勢。

With the increase of product variety, consumer returns policies are ubiquitous today. Many consumers have grown accustomed to being able to bring unwanted merchandise back to the store for just about any reason.
Consumer returns policies help to stimulate demand by protecting consumers against the possibility of product misfit. However, consumer returns policies may incur excess inventories and handling costs for firms when items are returned. What are the implications of returns policies on supply chain management? How does the refund influence the coordination mechanism and profitability of retailer and supplier? This paper aims to address these issues.
In this study, we consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The original newsvendor contract can be found easily in the history literature review. However, our research focuses on dealing with the problem causing from retailer, who offers partial returns to consumers when the product does not fit their individual needs or tastes. It means consumer can obtain partial refund of the product when he/she return the product to the retailer. With a push contract, the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The supplier knows the retailer’s reaction and the retailer orders the quantity base on the wholesale price before the selling season. Because of consumer returns policies, the retailer bears most of the inventory risk, that will not coordinate the supply chain. Hence, we use coordination mechanism (the buyback contract, the revenue and risk sharing contract) to coordinate the supply chain.

Arya, A., & Mittendorf, B. (2004). Using return policies to elicit retailer information. RAND Journal of Economics, 617-630.
Agrawal, V., & Seshadri, S. (2000). Impact of Uncertainty and Risk Aversion on Price and Order Quantity in the Newsvendor Problem. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2(4), 410-423.
Bhattacharyya, J.-C. L. G. (1990). Some New Constructions of Bivariate Weibull Models. Ann. Inst. Statist. Math., 42, 543-559.
Cachon, G. P., & Netessine, S. (2004). Game theory in supply chain analysis. In Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis (pp. 13-65). Springer US.
Cachon, G. P. (2003). Supply chain coordination with contracts. Handbooks in operations research and management science, 11, 227-339.
Che, Y.-K. (1996). Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods. The Journal of Industrial Economics, XLIV(1).
Davis, S., Hagerty, M., & Gerstner, E. (1998). Return policies and the optimal level of “hassle”. Journal of Economics and Business, 50(5), 445-460.
Emmons, H., & Gilbert, S. M. (1998). Note. The Role of Returns Policies in Pricing and Inventory Decisions for Catalogue Goods. Management Science, 44(2), 276-283.
Gerstner, S. D. M. H. E. (1998). Return Policies and the Optimal Level of Hassle. Journal of Economics and Business, 50.
Heiman, A., McWilliams, B., Zhao, J., & Zilberman, D. (2002). Valuation and management of money-back guarantee options. Journal of Retailing, 78(3), 193-205.
Hess, W. C. E. G. J. D. (1998). How to decrease customer opportunism by partial refunds.
Iyer, G., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2003). A bargaining theory of distribution channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(1), 80-100.
Kandel, E. (1996). The right to return. Journal of Law and Economics, 329-356.
Lawton, C. (2008). The War on Returns. Wall Street Jour. May 8. Page D1.
Lariviere, M. A., & Porteus, E. L. (2001). Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 3(4), 293-305.
Lariviere, M. A. (1999). Supply chain contracting and coordination with stochastic demand. In Quantitative models for supply chain management (pp. 233-268). Springer US.
Lu, J. C., & Bhattacharyya, G. K. (1990). Some new constructions of bivariate Weibull models. Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 42(3), 543-559.
Matthews, S. A., & Persico, N. (2007). Information acquisition and refunds for returns.
Matthews, S. A., & Persico, N. G. (2005). Information acquisition and the excess refund puzzle.
Marvel, H. P., & Peck, J. (1995). Demand uncertainty and returns policies.International Economic Review, 691-714.
Netessine, S., & Rudi, N. (2001). Supply chain structures on the Internet: Marketing-operations coordination under drop shipping. University of Pennsylvania Working Paper.
Ofek, E., Katona, Z., & Sarvary, M. (2011). “Bricks and Clicks”: The Impact of Product Returns on the Strategies of Multichannel Retailers. Marketing Science, 30(1), 42-60.
Padmanabhan, V., & Png, I. P. L. (2004). Reply to “Do returns policies intensify retail competition?”. Marketing Science, 23(4), 614-618.
Petruzzi, N. C., & Dada, M. (1999). Pricing and the newsvendor problem: A review with extensions. Operations Research, 47(2), 183-194.
Pasternack, B. A. (1985). Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities. Marketing science, 4(2), 166-176.
Shulman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T., & Savaskan, R. C. (2011). Managing Consumer Returns in a Competitive Environment. Management Science, 57(2), 347-362.
Su, X. (2009). Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 11(4), 595-612.
Savaskan, R. C., Bhattacharya, S., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2004). Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing. Management Science, 50(2), 239-252.
Sarvary, M., & Padmanabhan, V. (2001). The informational role of manufacturer returns policies: How they can help in learning the demand. Marketing Letters,12(4), 341-350.
Toktay, L. B. (2003). Forecasting product returns. L. N. Van Wassenhove, V. D. R. Guide, Jr., eds. Business Aspects of Closed Loop Supply Chains. Carnegie-Bosch Institute, Pittsburgh, 203–220.
Tsay, A. (2001). Managing Retail Channel Overstock- Markdown Money and Return Policies. Journal of Retailing, 457-492.
Tsay, A. (1999). Quantity-flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives. Management Science. 45(10). 1339-58.
Wong, W. K., Qi, J., & Leung, S. Y. S. (2009). Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory. International Journal of Production Economics, 120(1), 151-161.
Wood, S. L. (2001). Remote Purchase Environments- The Influence of Return Policy Leniency on Two-Stage Decision Process. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(2), 157-169.
Webster, S., & Weng, Z. K. (2000). A risk-free perishable item returns policy.Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2(1), 100-106.
Whitin, T. M. (1955). Inventory control and price theory. Management science,2(1), 61-68.