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研究生： 洪怡玟
Yi-Wen Hung
論文名稱： 產業競爭與購併類型對購併績效之影響
The Impact of Industry Competition and Merger Types On the Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions
指導教授： 徐政義
Cheng-Yi Shiu
口試委員:
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 財務金融學系
Department of Finance
論文出版年： 2017
畢業學年度： 105
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 50
中文關鍵詞： 產業競爭 、公司治理 、購併
外文關鍵詞： Industry Competition, Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions
相關次數： 點閱：9  下載：0 
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    • 本研究將產業競爭視為一種外部的公司治理機制，欲了解公司所處經營環境的產業競爭外生變數，對購併績效之影響。本研究發現處於競爭產業的公司會有顯著較高的購併宣告異常報酬，支持產業競爭能夠監督管理當局做出更好的投資決策，以及避免公司做建立自己王國的購併損害股東價值。其次，處於競爭產業的公司會傾向執行水平式購併降低產業競爭，並且有顯著較高的購併宣告異常報酬；此外，競爭產業也偏好複合式購併，但是其購併宣告的異常報酬卻低於一般產業和獨特產業。另一方面，處於不完全競爭的公司會藉由垂直整合提高進入障礙和避免競爭對手早一步整合以增加市場力量，但購併宣告的異常報酬不顯著為正。

    Given industry competition is regarded as one of the external corporate governance mechanism, this study analyzes the impact of industry competition, a natural exogenous variable, on the performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that acquirers in competitive industries experience significantly higher abnormal announcement return than those in noncompetitive industries. This result indicates that industry competition has a disciplinary effect on managerial slacks and prevents managers from empire-building acquisitions that are detrimental to shareholder value. In addition, acquirers in competitive industries prefer horizontal acquisitions, which can effectively mitigate industry competition, and such type of deals experiences significantly higher abnormal return than benchmarks. Acquirers in competitive industries also prefer conglomerate acquisitions, but this type of acquisition suffers a significantly negative announcement returns. On the other hand, acquirers in unique industries can strengthen their bargaining power and increase barriers to entry by engaging in vertical acquisitions. However, the announcement returns on such type of deals are insignificantly positive.

    中文摘要...............................................I Abstract..............................................II 誌　謝................................................III 目　錄.................................................V 表目錄.................................................VI 第一章　緒論............................................1 1-1　研究動機...........................................1 1-2　研究目的...........................................2 1-3　研究架構...........................................3 第二章　文獻探討.........................................4 2-1　外部治理機制 (external governance mechanisms).......4 2-2　購併績效...........................................6 2-3　購併類型...........................................7 第三章　樣本選擇與資料來源................................9 3-1　購併事件選樣標準及資料來源...........................9 3-2　股價資料來源.......................................10 3-3　財務資料來源.......................................10 第四章　研究設計........................................11 4-1　研究變數描述.......................................11 4-2　研究方法...........................................18 第五章　實證結果與分析...................................21 5-1　樣本分析與敘述統計..................................21 5-2　事件研究法結果.....................................24 5-3　迴歸分析結果.......................................25 第六章　結論............................................29 參考文獻...............................................31

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