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研究生: 宋易儒
Yi Ju Sung
論文名稱: 家族企業董事會結構與企業社會責任之關聯性
The Relevance of Family Business Board Structure and Corporate Social Responsibility
指導教授: 徐政義
Cheng Yi Shiu
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融學系
Department of Finance
論文出版年: 2020
畢業學年度: 108
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 52
中文關鍵詞: 家族企業董事會結構公司治理企業社會責任
外文關鍵詞: family corporate, director structure, corporate governance, CSR
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  • 本研究主要目的在探討家族企業董事會結構對於企業社會責任之影響。樣本使用台灣上市上櫃公司,共1383家公司,11064個樣本。研究結果顯示,台灣家族企業在企業社會責任表現上,比非家族企業表現還差。董事會結構部分,家族企業董事會規模越大,會減弱在企業社責任表現。另外,家族企業獨立董事比例越高,會增強企業社會責任表現。若家族企業董事長兼任總經,會減弱企業社會責任表現。家族企業若有控制權與現金流量權偏離的情形,會減弱企業社會責任表現,這也代表著台灣家族企業普遍使用交叉持股和金字塔結構掌握權力,削弱公司治理,造成「核心代理問題」。最後,家族企業經理人持股比越高,經理人越有誘因要保護自身利益,比較不會做出傷害公司價值的行為。


    The purpose of this research wants to find the relationship between the board structure of family firms and CSR performance. I use companies which are listed on Taiwan exchange market and OTC market. There are 1383 companies and 11064 samples. The result shows that family firms on CSR performance are worse than non-family firms. Besides, bigger board size in family firms will deteriorate their CSR performance. And the higher the proportion of independent directors in a family business, the stronger the CSR performance. Also, if the chairman of the family business concurrently serves as CEO, it will reduce CSR performance. And if a family company has a deviation between control and cash flow rights, it will reduce CSR performance. This also represents the widespread use of cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures to control power in Taiwan's family businesses, weakening corporate governance and causing "TypeⅡagency problem". Finally, the higher the shareholding ratio of family business managers, the more incentives managers have to protect their own interests, and less likely to harm the value of the company.

    中文摘要 I ABSTRACT II 誌謝 III 目錄 IV 圖目錄 V 表目錄 VI 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 背景與動機 1 1.2 研究目的 3 1.3 研究架構 3 第二章 文獻回顧與假說 6 2.1 家族企業定義: 6 2.2 家族企業對公司治理的影響 7 2.3 家族企業與企業社會責任. 8 2.4 家族企業的公司治理與CSR表現 10 第三章 研究方法 14 3.1 研究樣本 14 3.2 樣本分析 14 3.3 研究模型 16 3.4 變數定義 16 3.4.1 應變數 16 3.4.2 自變數 17 3.4.3 控制變數 18 第四章 實證結果與分析 20 4.1 敘述統計與單變量分析: 20 4.2 多變量分析 24 第五章 穩健性檢定 30 5.1 MSCI ESG SCORES 30 5.2 上市公司 30 5.3 TWSE 公司治理評鑑分數 31 第六章 結論 34 參考文獻: 36

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