自從Becker (1973) 的文章問世後, 許多學者投入研究婚配市場內的配對行為, 然
而卻鮮少有人研究異族通婚的問題, 我們從美國Current Population Survey(CPS
) 資料發現, 黑白婚配情況相當地稀少。本文採用Burdett and Coles (1995) 隨機
搜尋配對模型為基礎, 並應用Becker (1957) 對「偏見」等非貨幣誘因為外生的見
解, 推導出單向偏見、雙邊偏見以及共識偏見下婚配市場的均衡結果, 此三個理論
模型的結論均可有效解釋為何黑白婚配如此稀少, 單相偏見下, 我們發現優白人最
為強勢, 但不一定所有個體皆會模仿其決策; 雙邊偏見下, 在婚姻市場內占有較大
比例的人較有優勢; 共識偏見下, 會有人因偏見效果而被迫以單身姿態離開市場。

There are many economists have researched in searching and matching in
marriage market since the work of Becker (1973) but there are a few economists
research in black-white intermarriage problem. We find that the black-white
intermarriage is quite low from the United States Current Population Survey(
CPS) data. This thesis uses random search and match model proposed
by Burdett and Coles (1995) and combine Becker (1957) ’s opinion that the
discrimination is exogenous with model to derive the equilibrium result of
single discrimination, two side discrimination and consential discrimination.
We conclude that our model can explain that why does the black-white intermarriage
be low. We find that the best people is the good type of white but
not all of people will follow the decision of the good type of white. People
who has larger proportion would have the predominance in two side discrimination
model. there are some people would be forced to leave the market
by single cause of discrimination effect in consential discrimination model.

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