本文是針對美國聯邦最高法院一九八六年的領導個案 － Matsushita v. Zenith進行個案分析，該案為美國兩家電視機製造商，控告二十四家主要以日本廠商為主的廠商共謀從事掠奪性訂價。美國廠商指控日本廠商在日本以及美國市場採取一致性行為，目的是要將美國廠商逐出美國消費性電子產品市場。該案經過聯邦地方法院，第三上訴法院與聯邦最高法院三次審理，聯邦最高法院最後判決日本廠商勝訴。
本文先從理性投資的觀點來分析掠奪損失的回收，再探討掠奪性訂價共謀在執行上所會遭遇到的困難。結果發現，在廠商是理性的假設下，日本廠商會從事掠奪性訂價共謀的可能性非常低。而差別取價與追求規模經濟的說法，並無法完全解釋電視機在日本市場的價格高於美國市場的現象。所以，可能的理由就是日本廠商的生產成本較低，而日本國內市場的經銷成本較高。
經過深入分析Matsushita案，本文認為美國最高法院對於掠奪性訂價共謀採取謹慎的態度是正確的。因為一項不會創造利潤的行為會隨時間自動消失，廠商的行為若能長期存在，則代表該項行為可能具有競爭利益。法院一旦判斷錯誤懲罰到合法競爭，傷害到的將是整個競爭過程，所造成的社會損失將難以估計。

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期刊部分
期刊部分
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