本研究探討高科技產業中員工認股信託的設計條件對員工善意感知與工作激勵的影響。隨著政府推行分紅費用化政策，高科技企業紛紛採用員工認股信託以吸引並留住人才，但其設計條件的差異如何影響員工心理與行為尚未被充分研究。本研究採用質性方法，透過半結構式訪談8位高科技產業員工，分析五大關鍵設計因素：認股公司補助比例、認股員工負擔金額、離職時公司補助返還比例、員工全數/部分取回限制及股票買進週期，並探討其對善意感知與工作激勵的作用。

研究發現，認股公司補助比例為影響善意感知與工作激勵的最關鍵因素，其次依序為認股員工負擔金額、離職時公司補助返還比例、員工全數/部分取回限制及股票買進週期。高補助比例顯著提升員工對公司的信任與工作動機，而彈性負擔金額與較短的取回限制則增強參與意願。外部因素如股價成長亦對激勵效果有重要影響。本研究建議高科技產業優化補助比例、提供多元負擔選項、放寬取回與返還限制，並縮短買進週期，以平衡員工財務需求與組織目標，提升人才管理效能與競爭力。

This study investigates the impact of Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT) design conditions on employees’ perceived benevolence and work motivation within the high-tech industry. With the government’s promotion of stock option expensing policies, high-tech companies have increasingly adopted ESOT to attract and retain talent. However, the effects of varying design conditions on employees’ psychological and behavioral responses remain underexplored. Employing a qualitative approach, this study conducted semi-structured interviews with eight high-tech industry employees to examine five key design factors:

 Company subsidy ratio
 Employee contribution amount
 Subsidy return ratio upon resignation
 Restrictions on full or partial withdrawal
 Stock purchase cycle

The analysis focuses on how these factors influence perceived benevolence and work motivation.
The findings indicate that the company subsidy ratio is the most critical factor affecting both perceived benevolence and work motivation, followed by employee contribution amount, subsidy return ratio upon resignation, restrictions on withdrawal, and stock purchase cycle, in that order. A higher subsidy ratio significantly enhances employees’ trust in the company and boosts their work motivation, while flexible contribution amounts and shorter withdrawal restrictions increase their willingness to participate. External factors, such as stock price growth, also play a substantial role in amplifying the incentive effect. Based on these insights, the study recommends that high-tech firms optimize the subsidy ratio, offer diverse contribution options, relax restrictions on withdrawal and subsidy returns, and shorten the stock purchase cycle. These adjustments can better align employees’ financial needs with organizational objectives, ultimately enhancing talent management efficiency and competitiveness.

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