強化隱私保護之系統完整性回報系統｜國立中央大學博碩士論文系統

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研究生：	蘇奕彰 Yi-Zhang Su
論文名稱：	強化隱私保護之系統完整性回報系統 Privacy Enhanced Integrity Reporting Scheme
指導教授：	顏嵩銘 Sung-Ming Yen
口試委員:
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	資訊電機學院 - 資訊工程學系 Department of Computer Science & Information Engineering
論文出版年：	2017
畢業學年度：	105
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	62
中文關鍵詞：	完整性回報、隱私性、偽裝攻擊、可信賴平台模組、遠端驗證
外文關鍵詞：	Integrity reporting, Privacy, Masquerading attack, Trusted Platform Module, Remote Attestation
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查詢本校圖書館目錄查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統勘誤回報

隨著科技的快速發展，諸如電子商務與數位版權管理等系統皆被應用在各式各樣存有敏感性資料的儲存平台上，因此在進行交易或使用應用程式前，先行確保運算平台的狀態與完整性是必需的。為了驗證遠端運算平台完整性，可信賴運算集團(trusted computing group)提出了基於可信賴平台模組所設計的完整性回報系統(trusted platform module based integrity reporting scheme)。然而該方法卻無法抵抗偽裝攻擊(masquerading attack)，除此之外，其他可以抵擋偽裝攻擊的一些現有方法卻會遭受金鑰洩漏攻擊(key disclosure attack)。另一類透過Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)或Transport Layer Security (TLS)來建立安全通道並鎖定身份的方法被使用來抵擋偽裝攻擊，但是該類方法卻嚴重缺乏對隱私性的保護。身份相關訊息的洩漏能使攻擊者輕易的進行社交工程攻擊。因此在本論文中，我們提出一個強化隱私保護並成功抵擋偽裝攻擊以及金鑰洩漏攻擊的完整性回報系統。同時，我們也透過對隱私性的保護，大幅降低攻擊者成功進行社交工程攻擊的可能性。

With the rapid development of information technology, many digital applications take place on heterogeneous platforms storing sensitive data, such as e-commerce, on-line banking, enterprise security, and digital rights management. Ensuring the configurations and system status of the computing platforms is crucial before carrying out the applications. The trusted computing group proposed a trusted platform module based integrity reporting scheme used for verifying the configurations of a remote computing platform. Unfortunately, such scheme is vulnerable to a masquerading attack and existing solutions addressing the masquerading attack however suffered from a key disclosure attack. Alternative identity-based approach had been suggested by employing a secure channel (e.g., the SSL and TLS) for defending the masquerading attack, but the approach however was short of privacy protection. The leakage of identity information may be subject to a social engineering attack. In this thesis, we propose an enhanced integrity reporting scheme with user privacy protection and is free from the masquerading and key disclosure attacks that previous studies are vulnerable to.

Introduction 1
1 Background of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Motivation of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Preliminary of Trusted Computing and Related Work 7
1 Preliminary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1 Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Message Authentication Code and MAC based on Hash Function 7
1.3 Counter Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Introduction to TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Functionalities of TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Hierarchical Key Management of TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Transitive Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Related Work of Integrity Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 TPM-based Integrity Reporting Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Masquerading Attack on Integrity Reporting Schemes . . . . . 14
3.3 Integrity Reporting Schemes against Masquerading Attack . . 15
3.4 Integrity Reporting Schemes with Secure Communication Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Assumptions and the Proposed Scheme 20
1 Assumptions and Attack Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Attack Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Definition of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1 Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Contradiction between Security and User Privacy Protection . . . . . 23
4 Issuance of Authentication Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 The Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1 Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Verification Phase and Transaction Phase . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Security Analysis 32
1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.1 Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.2 Collusion Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.3 Malware Infection Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4 Pre-computation Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Masquerading Attack and Man-in-the-Middle Attack . . . . . 34
1.6 Key Disclosure Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Security Analysis on Service Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.8 Protection on User Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Update of Authentication Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4 Limitation of the Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Conclusions and Future Work 45
Bibliography 47
                                

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