歐盟執行委員會在2017年對於Google搜尋引擎濫用優勢地位至比價服務之爭議作出裁決，並祭予重罰，Google隨後向歐洲法院提起上訴。截至目前雖歐盟法院之判決尚未出爐，然該爭議已在各國競爭法領域中引發討論。首先，競爭法下企業濫用優勢地位之行為，亦即我國公平交易法中所規定禁止具有獨占地位之事業所為之行為，隨著數位時代新興資訊科技產業的發展下，在實際面臨個案法律分析時衍生許多問題，諸如現今資訊產業多元化發展的趨勢模糊了市場界線，導致界定市場更加困難。再者，濫用優勢地位的判斷上，在時常出現顛覆式創新的資訊科技產業中，導致縱使一具有極高市占率之企業，仍可能短時間迅速被新產品所取代。因此，本文藉由檢討歐盟執委會對於Google搜尋引擎在歐盟地區爭議案件的裁定內容，嘗試歸納出對於現今資訊科技產業濫用優勢地位之判斷，主管機關應嚴格遵守以市場上的競爭秩序是否遭受破壞為準則，探討對於市場上買受者而言，具有優勢地位企業之作為是否對其致生損害。而不應以該爭議企業對於其他競爭者有造成負面影響之結果，即判定該企業之作為違反競爭法規範，否則將可能產生倒果為因的情形。最後，由於Google搜尋引擎於2017年開始在台灣於施行與歐洲比價服務爭議事件相同之作為，是故本文藉由該爭議案件之討論來帶出對於台灣公平交易法之啟示。

In 2017, the EU Commission fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service. Google contested that it positioned and displayed its comparison shopping service more favorably in general search results pages compared to competing comparison shopping services and subsequently appealed to the Court of Justice. Up to now, although the Judgement has not been released, the dispute on this issue has triggered discussions related to Competition Law around the world. First of all, the discussion of abusing dominance by enterprises, that is, defined in Taiwan’s Fair Trade Law with the term “the prohibiting behavior of a monopoly business”, has faced several promlems in the actual legal analysis as the development of the information technology industry in the digital era. Such as the diversified development in information technology industry may blurs the market boundaries and makes it more difficult to define the market. Moreover, when it mentions to the abuse of dominant position, there is an occasion that subversive innovations happen often. It turns out surprisingly that even an existing product with high market share can be replaced by new product in a short period. Therefore, this thesis attempts to summarize the judgment on the abuse of dominant position in the information technology industry by reviewing EU Commission's decision on whether Google’s search engine has abused its market power to Google Shopping. And further leads to the conclusion that the competition authority should strictly comply the rule as examining whether a market’s competition order is under destruction. It should not be alleged that the disputed enterprise violates the Competition Law merely due to it has negative impacts on other competitors. Otherwise, it could lead to wrong decision. Lastly, given that Google search engine has carried out the same disputed strategies in Taiwan since last year, this thesis hence brings out the enlightenment of Taiwan's Fair Trade Law through the discussion of this disputed case.

中文文獻（依作者姓氏筆畫排序）
公平交易委員會，認識公平交易法，第16版，2015年。
公平交易委員會對於電信事業之規範說明，106/1/8公服字第10612600361號令發布。
公平交易委員會公處字第106094號處分書。
洪德欽，歐盟法的淵源，收錄於歐盟法之基礎原則與實務發展（上），臺大出版中心，2015年。
陳正倉、林惠玲、陳忠榮、莊春發，《產業經濟學:理論與實際》，雙葉書廊，第三版，2016年5月。

謝國廉，歐盟競爭法之架構與規範：以反競爭協議與濫用獨佔地位之規範為中心，收錄於歐盟法之基礎原則與實務發展（下），臺大出版中心，2015年。

吳俞慶，張安潔，試析搜尋引擎市場下的濫用市場優勢地位－以歐盟比價購物案為例，經貿法訊第219期，頁1-10，2017年10月。

阮韻蒨，以雙邊市場角度分析搜尋引擎的相關市場，公平交易季刊第26卷第1期，頁47-73，107年1月。

許曉芬，歐盟競爭法關於限制競爭協議之研究－以市場界定為與市場效果為中心，公平交易季刊第25卷第3期，頁1-34，2017年2月19日。

陳訓平，王年燦，網路廣告的呈現方式與消費者態度之關係，2003應用媒體暨動畫藝術理論與實務研討會論文集，頁20-30，2003年。

陳信宏，競爭法於我國及國際間之執法概況及影響，貿易政策論叢第28期，頁303-339，2017年12月。

曾秀珍，歐盟(區域)競爭法相關之法律整合，公平交易委員會電子報，頁1-6，2014年。

賴文智，顏雅倫，看懂反托拉斯案件中的「市場力量」與「相關市場」，經貿透視第464期，頁122-124，2017年3月29日。

戴豪君，歐洲共同體競爭法中企業濫用優勢地位之研究，公平交易季刊第4卷第4期，頁39-94，2013 年。

顏雅倫，雙邊市場/多邊市場之競爭與創新－論競爭法的因應，科技法學評論第13卷第1期，頁219-266，2016年。

阮韻蒨，搜尋引擎在非價格交易限制之競爭效果法律分析，中原大學財經法律研究所碩士論文，2016年。

郭政雄，關鍵設施原則在競爭法上之應有定位：以基礎設施理論為中心，交通大學科技法律研究所碩士碖文，2014年。

黃靖民，論競爭法對資訊產業濫用優勢地位之判斷-以微軟及 Google 於美國、歐盟法之法律爭議經濟分析反思我國法制，東吳大學法律學系碩士論文，2016年。
張媛筑，競爭法上使用者數據之應用地位與可能造成的衝擊，國立政治大學法律科際整合研究所碩士學位論文，2018年1月。

網路資源
沈建一，橫行霸道的Google吃到歐盟苦頭，經濟部國際貿易局網站，2017年7月13日。
https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45&pid=609022
胡祖舜，Google和解為哪樁？−搜尋偏愛(search bias)的正反論，公平交易委員會電子報，第24期，2015年4月1日。
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/1040401-1.pdf
高敬原，遭歐盟指控偏袒自家比價服務，Google Shopping將分拆為獨立部門，數位時代，2017年9月27。
https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/46333/google-to-spin-out-shopping-service-report-says
陳浩凱，以獨占事業的觀點論析Google垂直搜尋服務的違法性，公平交易委員會電子報，第41期，2015年12月。
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/1041216-2.pdf
陳志民，大數據時代下之競爭政策思維與法規範建制，公平交易通訊，第79期，2018年1月。
https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/4f19203f-47b3-4cf9-8c8a-51bbbf7d2317.pdf
曾秀珍，歐盟(區域)競爭法相關之法律整合，公平交易委員會電子報，第15期，2014年。
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/1031119-1.pdf
外國文獻
Journal Articles, Book Chapters and Reports
Antitrust Procedure Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, European Commission (June 27, 2017).
Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purpose of Community Competition Law (97/C 372/03), European Commission, (1997)
DOJ/FTC, horizontal merger guidelines (2010).
Drozdiak, Natalia & Schechner, Sam, Google Slapped With $2.7 Billion EU Fine Over Search Results, the wall street journal (June 27, 2017).
Edelman, Benjamin, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling? 11(2) j.c.l.& e 365 (2015).
European Commission Factsheet, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service, (27 June 2017).
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service, (June 27, 2017).
European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android, (15 April 2015).
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications (20 April 2016).
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google's Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules (14 July 2016).
Evans, David S. & Schmalensee, Richard, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,3 competition policy international 13 (2007).
Filistrucchi, Lepo &D. Geradin, &E.V. Damme&P. Affeldt, Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice,10 Journal Of Competition, Law & economics (2014).
Lao, Marina, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 nw. j. tech. & intell 275, 298 (2013).
López-tarruella Martínez, Aurelio, google and the law: empirical approaches to legal aspects of knowledge-economy business models, the springer (2012).
Manne, Geoffrey A. & Rinehart, William, The Market Realities that Undermined the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Google, 7 harvard journal of law & technology occasional paper series (2013).
Manne, Geoffrey A. & Wright, Joshua D., Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 harv. j.l. & pub. pol’y 171 (2011).
OECD Competition Committee Roundtables, Big Data: Bring Competition Policy to the Digital Era (2016).
Posner, Richard A., The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. pa. l. rev. 925, 934 (1979).
Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1.4 j eur econ assoc 990 (2003).
Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 rand j econ 645 (2006).
Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule. 26 int j ind organ 1333 (2008).
Web Resources
Commitments in case COMP/C-3/39.740 Foundem and others (January 31, 2014),http://docs.dpaq.de/6448-google_commitments_full.pdf.
Ghosh,Shona, Here's the Letter Spotify's Founders Wrote to the EU Complaining Apple and Google are abusive, Business Insider (May 8, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/spotify-deezer-rocket-internet-letter-european-commission-2017-5.
Google's Terms of Service, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/.
Keating, Ruth, Google: King or Kingmaker? Oxford Business Law Blog (Aug 16, 2017),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/08/google-king-or-kingmaker.

Krafcik, Jon, Greater Control with New Features in Your Ads Settings, Google Blog (Jan 25, 2018)
https://www.blog.google/topics/safety-security/greater-control-new-features-your-ads-settings/.

Lao, Marina, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 nw. j. tech. & intell. prop.275(2013), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol11/iss5/2/
Marsten, Elizabeth, Google’s New Shopping Actions Program: What You Need to Know, SEJ Search Engine Journal (April 3, 2018),
https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-shopping-actions-program/246505/ .
Pot, Justin, Why Ad Companies Love Google’s Ad Blocker, But Hate Apple’s Privacy Features (Feb 14, 2018),
https://www.howtogeek.com/342297/why-ad-companies-love-googles-ad-blocker-but-hate-apples-privacy-features/.
Ruby, Daniel, The Value of Google Result Positioning, Chitika Insights (May 25, 2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110127051208/insights.chitika.com/2010/the-value-of-google-result-positioning.

Walker, Kent, SVP & General Counsel, Improving Quality Isn’t Anti-Competitive (2015/8/27),
https://europe.googleblog.com/2015/08/improving-quality-isnt-anti-competitive.html.