整體而言，董事會規模在9至14人時為最佳的董事會結構，當董事會規模大於14人或小於9人，則將因缺乏效率而降低盈餘傳遞效果；此外，常董會人數介於3至5人時，常董會較能發揮監督與管理的機制，提昇盈餘傳遞效果。若分最終控制者類型討論，董事會規模較大的公營銀行，其適合存在較多常董人數與獨立外部董事人數，使得董事會能有效發揮監督機制與平衡成員組織，相對地，過多常董會人數與獨立外部董事人數比卻無法提供家族銀行有效的控管功能，反而會降低盈餘傳遞效果。

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