家族企業接班是目前世界非常關注的重要議題，而僅有少數的家族企業傳承超過一代，傳承的問題顯然已成為很多家族企業共同面臨的困境，如何規劃一個完善的接班人計劃對於家族企業的永續經營是非常重要且關鍵的。當企業釋出決策消息時，企業治理結構常會做為股票市場的投資者參考的重要資訊。本研究藉由蒐集台灣上市櫃公司的家族企業，在2006至2014年發生領導者異動事件，分析該公司的治理結構差異，其中包括代表監督力的董事會規模、董事會獨立程度、外國法人持股比例，以及代表家族控制力的家族控制權、家族盈餘分配權、家族董事會控制力，透過事件研究法分析股票市場對於該事件公告的反應結果，亦即了解事件造成的市場效果。
在樣本平均累積異常報酬值的檢定結果中，發現在事件發生前十二天到事件發生後七天都有負向統計顯著，也進一步將事件發生前十二天至事件發生後七天分成六個事件區間與接班人選以及治理結構中的監督力、家族控制力進行迴歸分析，迴歸分析結果發現只有五個區間，在接班人選方面，該變數會與市場效果呈現正向顯著結果，而在公司治理方面，監督力也是呈現正向顯著結果，家族控制力則是負向顯著結果。

Nowadays, succession planning is a crucial issue to family businesses all around the world, and there are only few cases of successful family successions. How to ensure a smooth transition in succession plan is a critical issue for many family businesses to face as well as a key determinant for sustainable development. Corporate governance is often seen as important information source for investors to make investment decision; and it can also ease the agency problems within the organizations. This study used data of public traded family businesses within Taiwan from 2006 to 2014, using event study to analyze their leader changing events, including supervision (board size, the number of independent directors, proportion of foreign investment) and family control (family voting right, family cash flow right, family board). The purpose of this study is to understand the reaction of stock market to the change of leader in firms with different corporate governance.
Analyzed result showed that there was negatively significant of corporates’ cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in 12 days before and 7 days after the happened event. For further study, this time frame was divided into 6 periods of time, using regression to study the relationship between succession candidates, corporate governance (supervision and family control) and these time frames. Results demonstrated that the variation of candidates is positively significant in only five periods and the variation of supervision is positively significant, but the variation of family control is negatively significant.

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