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| 研究生： |
高郁涵 Yu-Han Kao |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
目標公司執行長年齡與併購決策 |
| 指導教授： |
李韋憲
Wei-Hsien Li |
| 口試委員: | |
| 學位類別： |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱： |
管理學院 - 財務金融學系 Department of Finance |
| 論文出版年： | 2016 |
| 畢業學年度： | 104 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 47 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 執行長 、年齡 、併購 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | CEO, Age, M&A |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：17 下載：0 |
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本研究利用失敗交易案作為樣本，探討Jenter and Lewellen (2015)提到認為年輕的目標公司執行長會因為私人成本而拒絕對股東有益之交易案，產生利益衝突。本研究使用Savor and Lu (2009)方法來篩選交易案失敗原因，用以查看目標公司主動拒絕而失敗的交易案之執行長特性。實證結果發現在失敗交易案當中，年輕的目標公司執行長的確佔較高之比例，並且發現在目標公司拒絕而失敗之交易案中，年輕的執行長於交易案宣告時市場反應較好，卻於交易案失敗時，有顯著負報酬。這表示這些年輕的執行長其實是會為了私人成本而拒絕對股東有益之交易案，產生利益衝突的。此結論與Jenter and Lewellen (2015)相同。
This paper use withdrawn deals to be sample in order to discuss that if younger target CEOs reject M&A deals because of his or her own private cost, which is referred in Jenter and Lewellen (2015). We use the approach in Savor and Lu (2009) to classify the reason why the deals are withdrawn and use it to see CEO’s behavior in the withdrawn deals that is rejected by target firm. We find that a high proportion of withdrawn deals are associated with the younger CEOs, suggesting that younger target CEOs tend to reject the deals. We also find that the deals eventually rejected by younger target CEOs are associated with better market reaction when deals were announced, but are associated with significant negative returns when deals are withdrawn. Thus market suspects these younger CEOs reject deal because of his or her own private cost, which is consistent with the conclusion of Jenter and Lewellen (2015).
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