當供應商面臨一個風險趨避的零售商在營收分享合約下所達成的通路協調

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

回結果列表

研究生：	李彥璁 Yen-tsung Lee
論文名稱：	當供應商面臨一個風險趨避的零售商在營收分享合約下所達成的通路協調 Channel coordination under the revenue sharing contract when a supplier faces a risk-averse retailer
指導教授：	曾富祥 Fu-shiang Tseng
口試委員:
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 工業管理研究所 Graduate Institute of Industrial Management
畢業學年度：	98
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	46
中文關鍵詞：	通路協調、營收分享合約、風險趨避
外文關鍵詞：	channel coordination, revenue sharing contract, risk aversion
相關次數：	點閱：15 下載：0
分享至:	分享至facebook 分享至twitter

查詢本校圖書館目錄查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統勘誤回報

通路協調已經在很多的論文中被探討,其目標是極大化整體供應鏈的利潤進而提升供應商及零售商的利潤。有很多誘因機制被提出來以達成通路協調。舉例來說,在營收分享合約裡,供應商提供一個較低的批發價給零售商,但必須享有零售商一部分比例的收益以達成通路協調。過去的研究都是立基於假設供應商和零售商為風險中立者。然而,決策制定者對風險可能有不同的感受,這些感受會影響其所作的決定。因此,我們在營收分享合約裡考量了決策者的風險感受。
本研究中,我們依據決策者的風險感受來探討營收分享合約。在推式合約之下,供應商提供營收分享合約給零售商,以達到增加彼此利潤的目的；由於零售商承擔存貨風險,因此零售商對風險的感受會影響其所做的決定。所以當供應商面對風險趨避的零售商時,應該考量其風險態度來訂定決策。本文透過營收分享合約的模型探討兩種情況;情況一是探討當供應商不知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者的情形。而情況二是供應商知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者。我們發現在情況一下無法達成通路協調,而在情況二下可以達成通路協調。

Channel coordination has been discussed in many studies, whose objective is to maximize the supply chain''s profit that elevates both the supplier''s and the retailer''s profits. Many coordination mechanisms were proposed to achieve channel coordination. For example, in a revenue sharing contract, the supplier provides a lower wholesale price with sharing a certain fraction of revenue to achieve channel coordination. Most of coordination mechanisms are discussed based on considering risk-neutral decision makers. In other words, the supplier''s and the retailer''s attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neural when making decisions. However, the decision makers may have different preferences toward risks. Therefore, we consider their risk preferences into the design of revenue sharing contract in this study.
In a push contract, the retailer bears all of the inventory risk, and the retailer''s attitude toward risk affects her decision. As a result, it is important for the supplier to consider the opponent''s risk preference. In this study, the supplier provides a revenue sharing contract to the risk-averse retailer in order to increase both profits. We analyze two cases. In case 1, the supplier does not know the retailer is risk-averse, and in case 2, the supplier knows the retailer is risk-averse. We discuss these two cases in the revenue sharing contract and we find that channel coordination cannot be achieved in case 1, but it can be achieved in case 2.

Contents
中文摘要..................................................i
Abstract.................................................ii
Contents................................................iii
The contents of figures...................................v
The contents of tables...................................vi
1. Introduction...........................................1
1.1 Background/Motivation..............................1
1.2 Research objectives................................2
2. Literature review......................................4
2.1 Newsvendor problem.................................4
2.2 Risk aversion......................................5
2.3 Coordination mechanism.............................6
3. Model and analysis.....................................8
3.1 A risk-neutral retailer...........................11
3.2 A risk-averse retailer............................14
4. Numerical example.....................................24
4.1 A risk-neutral retailer...........................24
4.2 A risk-averse retailer............................26
4.3 More examples.....................................29
5. Sensitivity analysis..................................35
6. Conclusion and future research........................41
6.1 Conclusion........................................41
6.2 Future research...................................42
References...............................................43
Appendix.................................................45
A1. Proof of Proposition 4...............................45
A2. Proof of Proposition 5...............................46
The contents of figures
Figure 3-1 The certainty equivalent of risk aversion.....15
Figure 4-1 The profit of the supply chain in case 1 while facing different risk-averse retailers...................31
Figure 5-1 The effects of the selling price..............37
Figure 5-2 The effects of the production cost............38
Figure 5-3 The effects of the parameter in the demand distribution.............................................39
Figure 5-4 The effects of the parameter in the demand   distribution.............................................40
The contents of tables
Table 3-1 Definition of notations.........................9
Table 3-2 The profits in risk-neutral case under different contracts................................................13
Table 3-3 The profits in risk-averse case under different contracts................................................22
Table 4-1 The profits in risk-neutral case under different contracts................................................24
Table 4-2 The profits in risk-neutral case under different contracts................................................25
Table 4-3 The profits of facing a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse retailer (case 1) under the revenue sharing contract.................................................26
Table 4-4 The profits in case 2 under different contracts27
Table 4-5 The profits in case 2 under different contracts28
Table 4-6 Order quantity of the risk-neutral retailer and the profit of the supply chain in different w............29
Table 4-7 The profits in case 2 under the revenue sharing contract.................................................30
Table 4-8 Order quantity of different risk-averse retailers in case 1................................................30
Table 4-9 The result of Proposition 6....................31
Table 4-10 The solutions of the case 2 model.............32
Table 4-11 The wholesale price given the same fraction in case 2 under the revenue sharing contract................33
Table 4-12 The feasible set of the fraction in case 2 under the revenue sharing contract.............................34

                                

1. Agrawal, V., and Seshadri, S.,“Impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on price and order quantity in the newsvendor problem,”Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 410–423, 2000.
2. Basak, S., and Shapiro, A.,“Value-at-risk-based risk management: optimal policies and asset prices,”The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 371-405, 2001.
3. Cachon, G. P.,“The allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain: push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts,”Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 222-238, 2002.
4. Cachon, G. P., Supply chain coordination with contracts, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2003.
5. Cachon, G. P., and Lariviere, M. A.,“Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations,”Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 30-44, 2000.
6. Coyle, B. T.,“Risk aversion and yield uncertainty in duality models of production: a mean-variance approach,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 553-567, 1999.
7. Choi, T. M., Li, D., Yan, H., and Chiu, C. H.,“Channel coordination in supply chains with agents having mean-variance objectives,”Omega, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 565-576, 2007.
8. Chen, F., and Federgruen, A., Mean-variance analysis of basic inventory models, Columbia University, New York, USA, 2000.
9. Chen, X., Sim, M., Levi, D. S., and Sun, P.,“Risk aversion in inventory management,”Operation Research, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 828-842, 2007.
10. Dong, L., and Zhu, K.,“Two-wholesale-price contracts: push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 291-311, 2007.
11. Eeckhoudt, L., Gollier, C., and Schlesinger, H.,“The risk-averse (and prudent) newsboy,”Management Science, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 786-794, 1995.
12. Giannoccaro, I., and Pontrandolfo, P.,“Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts,”International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 131-139, 2004.
13. Hopp, W. J., and Spearman, M. L., Factory physics: foundations of manufacturing management, Irwin, USA, 1995.
14. Jorion, P., Value at risk: the new benchmark for controlling market risk, Irwin, Chicago, 1997.
15. Khouja, M.,“The single-period (news-vendor) problem: literature review and suggestions for future research,” Omega, Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 537-553, 1999.
16. Keeney, R. L., and Raiffa, H., Decision with multiple objectives, Wiley, New York, 1993.
17. Lariviere, M. A., and Porteus, E. L.,“Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 293-305, 2001.
18. Petruzzi, N. C., and Dada, M.,“Pricing and the newsvendor problem: a review with extension,”Operations Research, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 4702-0183, 1999.
19. Pasternack, B. A., Using revenue sharing to achieve channel coordination for a newsboy type inventory model, Springer, USA, 2002.
20. Pasternack, B. A.,“Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities,”Marketing Science, Vol. 4, No 2, pp. 166-176, 1985.
21. Sarmah, S. P., and Acharya, D.,“Coordination of a single-manufacturer/multi-buyer supply chain with credit option,”International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 111, No. 2, pp. 676-685, 2008.
22. Telser, L. G.,“Safety-first and hedging,”The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1-16, 1955.
23. Tseng, F. S., Tang, K., and Li, Y.,“Performance-based maintenance outsourcing with risk-averse contractors,” Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, Indiana, USA, 2004.
24. Tseng, C. T.,“Decision making of a supplier facing a risk-averse retailer in the newsvendor problem,”National Central University, Jhongli City, Taiwan, 2007.
25. Viswanathan, S., and Piplani, R.,“Coordinating supply chain inventories through common replenishment epochs,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 277-286, 2001.

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

相關論文