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研究生： 李明軒
MingHsuan Lee
論文名稱： 中國上市公司獨立董事的政治連結、營運資金管理與公司績效關係之探討
指導教授： 洪榮華
口試委員:
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 企業管理學系在職專班
Executive Master of Business Administration
論文出版年： 2019
畢業學年度： 107
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 50
中文關鍵詞： 營運資金管理 、現金轉換週期 、獨立董事政治連結
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    • 本研究為了探討獨立董事的政治連結、營運資金管理與公司績效關係，以 2008年到 2016 年間中國上市公司為對象，分別探討 (1) 以總資產報酬率(ROA)為主要應變數，計 11,397 筆資料，研究獨立董事政治連結與公司績效的關係；(2) 以現金轉換週期(CCC)為主要應變數，計 11,360 筆資料，研究獨立董事政治連結與營運資金管理的關係；以及(3) 以總資產報酬率(ROA)為主要應變數，計 11,366 筆資料，探討營運資金管理對獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之間的關係。實證研究採 Panel data analysis，結果發現獨立董事的政治連結在國有企業(SOEs)對公司績效有負面的影響，但在非國有企業(Non-SOEs)則是正面的影響；獨立董事的政治連結在SOEs對營運資金管理有正面的影響，但在 Non-SOEs 則是負面的影響。另外也發現，營運資金管理對獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之間的調節效果不明顯。

    This study investigates the listed companies in China for the period from 2008 to 2016 in order to explore the relationship among political connections of independent directors, working capital management and corporate performance. Panel data analysis is utilized and numbers of observations are 11,397, 11,360 and 11,366, respectively, in examining the relationship between political connections of independent directors and ROA, and that between political connections of independent directors and CCC, as well as the moderating effect of CCC on the relationship between political connections of independent directors and ROA. The empirical results show that independent directors with political connections have a negative impact on corporate performance in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but the effect becomes positive in non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). In addition, the independent directors with political connections positively influence working capital management in SOEs, however, the impact is negative in Non-SOEs. Finally, the moderating effect of CCC on the relationship between political connections of independent directors and ROA is not significant.

    中文摘要 ……………………………………………………………… i 英文摘要 ……………………………………………………………… ii 目錄 ……………………………………………………………… iii 表目錄 ……………………………………………………………… v 第一章 緒論………………………………………………………… 1 1-1 研究動機與目的…………………………………………… 1 1-2 研究架構與流程…………………………………………… 2 第二章 文獻探討與假說建立……………………………………… 4 2-1 獨立董事政治連結與公司績效的關係…………………… 4 2-2 獨立董事政治連結與營運資金管理的關係……………… 6 2-3 營運資金管理對獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之間的關係……… 8 第三章 研究方法…………………………………………………… 10 3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選……………………………………… 10 3-2 研究方法與模型建立……………………………………… 10 3-3 假說一之模型建立………………………………………… 10 3-3-1 變數衡量…………………………………………… 11 3-3-1-1 應變數衡量……………………………………… 11 3-3-1-2 自變數衡量……………………………………… 11 3-3-1-3 控制變數衡量…………………………………… 12 3-4 假說二之模型建立………………………………………… 13 3-4-1 變數衡量…………………………………………… 13 3-4-1-1 應變數衡量……………………………………… 13 3-4-1-2 自變數衡量……………………………………… 14 3-4-1-3 控制變數衡量…………………………………… 15 3-5 假說三之模型建立………………………………………… 15 3-5-1 變數衡量…………………………………………… 16 3-5-1-1 應變數衡量……………………………………… 16 3-5-1-2 自變數衡量……………………………………… 16 3-5-1-3 控制變數衡量…………………………………… 16 第四章 結論與建議………………………………………………… 18 4-1 基本敘述性統計分析……………………………………… 18 4-2 多變量分析結果…………………………………………… 22 4-2-1 獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之關係…………… 22 4-2-2 獨立董事政治連結與營運資金管理之關係……… 25 4-2-3 營運資金管理對獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之間的關係……… 28 4-3 穩健性測詴………………………………………………… 30 第五章 結論與建議………………………………………………… 35 5-1 研究結論…………………………………………………… 35 5-2 研究限制與建議…………………………………………… 36 參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………… 37

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