隨著永續意識的抬頭，廠商的綠色責任似乎是消費者、政府乃至全球所樂見的。然而企業的永續行動代表著廠商需投入更多成本在生產低汙染之產品，如此高昂的成本成了廠商卻步於投入綠色資源的原因，進而導致了先發劣勢及搭便車的情形發生。故本文欲探討廠商可否利用合作來解決此一窘境，而此時競爭法主管機關又應如何看待該等永續的聯合行為。

儘管各國競爭法主管機關紛紛出具了綠色協議的處理原則，然我國公平會至今仍無強烈表態，在立委的敦促下公平會終於今(2024)年3月承諾半年內會制定相關處理原則。是以，本文藉分析歐盟、日本、英國以及新加坡等國的永續協議處理原則，歸納出各國的異同，同時搭配我國立法與產業背景，最後給予公平會政策性建議。

本文建議我國之綠色處理原則可僅限縮於討論環境的聯合行為問題，並可加入附屬性限制原則來評估。而內容可仿效其他國家分成「不太可能違法之綠色聯合行為」、「可能違法之綠色聯合行為」，以及「可豁免之綠色聯合行為」三大部分加以詳述。然由於永續在部份情況下難以量化以及受益消費者之界定範圍恐有爭議，故此部分可能亦可能為公平會未來將面臨的挑戰。

As the rise of sustainability awareness, corporate sustainable responsibility is welcomed by consumers, government even the global communities. However, the green actions mean the firms need to invest more cost in green innovation. This situation will lead to a first mover disadvantage and increase the number of free riders. Therefore, this article aims to explore whether green cooperation could alleviate this dilemma as well as how competition law work in green collaboration.

In fact, many competition authorities had already published sustainability agreements guidelines, yet, our Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) does not made the statements. Under the urging of legislators, TFTC finally promised to release a relevant report within six months. Thus, this article will try to summary the sustainability agreements guidelines from European Union, Japan, the UK and Singapore while considering our legislative and industrial background then proposed the policy briefs to our TFTC.

This article suggests our green agreements guidelines could just be limited to focus on the concerted action which relate to environmental protection issues. It could adopt ancillary restraints to evaluate cases. Additionally, the guidelines could be modeled after other countries, dividing into three main parts: “Green concerted action that unlikely to be illegal”, “Green concerted action that may be illegal”, and “Exempted”. While it is worth to note that sustainability can be difficult to quantify in certain situations, and there may be disputes over the definition of fair share. Therefore, this aspect could also pose a challenge for TFTC in the future.

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