本研究以國內上市、上櫃與興櫃公司為研究對象，探討企業屬於董事長與總經理非為同一人兼任之情形下，董事長與總經理之權力差距對於公司長期性投資決策以及整體經營效率所產生的影響，並以董事長與總經理年資作為衡量兩者權力差距之代理變數，樣本期間為2006年至2013年。本實證研究發現，在公司存在著「論資排輩」的職場淺規則，使得董事長權力大過於總經理權力的合理假設之下，公司之經營方針將會以董事長個人利益為依歸。董事長權力愈大，其投入於長期性之研究發展與資本支出的意願將會愈高，且公司現金股利發放比率愈低，最終導致公司經營效率不佳，產生管理階層與外部股東之間的代理問題。研究發展費用項目屬於裁量性支出，且具備高風險特性，容易造成內部人與外部股東之間存在著資訊不對稱，經營效率不佳便是反映出董事長會為了滿足私人利益而產生過度投資行為，現金股利支付率低亦隱含著公司內部人所擁有的自由現金流量增加，產生潛在資金濫用的問題。本研究進一步的結果發現，當董事長對於公司實際經營權力凌駕於專業經理人時，投資大眾將會對於董事長之決策動機產生疑慮，進而導致公司股票價格波動程度增加，並且提高要求報酬率，使公司所面臨之權益資金成本增加。

This study examine the relationship between the power of chairman and the corporate long-term investment decisions. Theoretically, when firms’ managerial structure are separate titles, chairmen only hold an iconic role in an enterprise and seldom get involved in firm’s daily operations, and CEOs(or general managers) are the dominantly governing role to take charge of the entire run and business. In other words, CEOs enjoy the major decisions power. In Taiwan, however, there is a common phenomenon that a firm’s chairman seems to own the actual managerial power. I employ chairman tenure and CEO tenure as the proxy for power. The empirical evidence show that chairman power has a positive impact on R&D investment and capital expenditure, suggesting that powerful chairman would make the long-term investment decisions consist with the interest of the shareholders. However, further results show that the powerful chairman would result in agency costs and induce higher cost of equity. The findings suggest that the more powerful the chairman is, the more operating inefficiency would be.

王健安 (2002)，「公司治理的模式與評估」，台灣金融財務季刊，第三輯，第三期。
司徒達賢 (2008)，「家族與專業經理人共治的優點」，工商時報，D4經營知識。
司徒達賢 (2011)，「家族退出企業問題未必解決」，今周刊，751期。
俞海琴 (1994)，「內部人事持股比率與融資策略關係之實證研究」，管理評論，第13卷，第2期，109-131。
樊景立與鄭伯壎 (2000)，「華人組織的家長式領導：一項文化觀點的分析」，本土心理學研究，第13期，127-180。
樊景立、鄭伯壎與周麗芳 (2000)，「家長式領導：三元模式的建構與測量」，本土心理學研究，第14期，3-64。
Aboody, David and Lev, Baruch (2000), “Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 2747-2766.
Adams, Renée B., Almeida, Heitor and Ferreira, Daniel (2005), “Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18, 1403-1432.
Alam, Pervaiz, Liu, Min and Peng, Xiaofeng (2014), “R&D expenditures and implied equity risk premiums”, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 43, 441-462.
Ang, J. S., Cole, R.A. and Lin, J. W. (2000), “Agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 81-106.
Baker, Norman and Freeland, James (1975), “Recent Advances in R&D Benefit Measurement and Project Selection Methods”, Management Science, Vol. 21, 1164-1175.
Barker, Vincent L., III and Mueller, George C. (2002), “CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending”, Management Science, Vol. 48, 782-801.
Baliga, B. R., Moyer, R. C. and Rao, R. S. (1996), “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What's the Fuss?”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, 41-53.
Bathala, Chenchuramaiah T., Moon, K. P. and Rao, R. P. (1994), “Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective”, Financial Management, Vol. 23, 38-50.
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, Rita D. and Turk, Thomas A. (1991), “Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 34, 205-214.
Baysinger, B. and Hoskisson, R. E. (1989), “Diversification Strategy and R&D Intensity in Multiproduct Firms”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32, 310-332.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto (1979), “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy”, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.10, 259-270.
Brickley, James A., Coles, Jeffrey L. and Jarrell, Gregg (1997), “Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.3, 189-220.
Chan, Louis K. C., Lakonishok, Josef and Sougiannis, Theodore (2001), “The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, 2431-, 2456.
Chang, Rosita P. and Rhee, S. Ghon (1990), “The Impact of Personal Taxes on Corporate Dividend Policy and Capital Structure Decisions”, Financial Management, Vol. 19, 21-31.
Chung, Kee H. and Pruitt, Stephen W. (1994), “A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s Q”, Financial Management, Vol. 23, 70-74.
Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P. (2000), “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.58, 81-112.
Davis, James H., Schoorman, F. David and Donaldson, Lex (1997), “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, 20-47.
DeAngelo, Harry and DeAngelo, Linda (1990), “Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, 1415-1431.
Deangelo, Harry and Masulis, Ronald W. (1980), “Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 3-29.
Denis, David J. (1994), “Investment Opportunities and the Market Reaction to Equity Offerings”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, 159-177.
Deshmukh, Sanjay (2005), “The Effect of Asymmetric Information on Dividend Policy”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Vol.44, 107-127.
Donaldson, Lex and Davis, James H. (1991), “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns”, Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 16, 49-64.
Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984), “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, Vol.74, 650-659.
Eisenberg, Theodore, Sundgren, Stefan and Wells, Martin T. (1998), “Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.48, 35-54.
Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R. (2001), “Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? ”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 60, 3-43.
Finkelstein, Sydney and D'Aveni, Richard A. (1994), “CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.37, 1079-1108.
Finkelstein, Sydney and Hambrick, Donald C. (1990), “Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, 484-503.
Green, Stephen G. (1995), “Top Management Support of R&D Projects: A Strategic Leadership Perspective”, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 43, 223-232.
Hambrick, Donald C. and Fukutomi, Gregory D. S. (1991), “The Seasons of a CEO's Tenure”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.16, 719-742.
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, Michael S. (1988), “The Determinants of Board Composition”, Financial Management, Vol. 19, 589-606.
Hill, Charles W. L. and Snell, Scott A. (1989), “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32, 25-, 46.
Hillman, A. J. and Dalziel, Thomas (2003), “Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, 383-396.
Hoskisson, Robert E., Hitt, Michael A. and Hill, Charles W. L. (1993), “Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms”, Organization Science, Vol. 4, 325-341.
Jensen, Michael C. (1986), “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, 323-329.
Jense, Michael C. n and Meckling, William H. (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, 305-360.
Kim, Sungsoo, Pilotte, Eugene and Yang, Joon Sun (2012), “Agency Costs and the Short-Run Stock Price Response to Capital Expenditures”, Financial Review, Vol. 47, 375-399.
Lang, Larry, Ofekb, Eli and Stulz, Rene M. (1996), “Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, 3-29.
Lehn, Kenneth and Poulsen, Annette (1989), “Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, 28-30.
Li, Donglin (2004), “The Implications of Capital Investments for Future Profitability and Stock Returns—an Overinvestment Perspective”, Working Paper.
Lintner, John (1956), “Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes”, American Economic Review, Vol. 46, 97-113.
Mansfield, Edwin (1986), “Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study”, Management Science, Vol. 32, 173-181.
Mehran, Hamid (1995), “Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 38, 163–184.
Miller, Danny (1991c), “Stale in the Saddle: CEO Tenure and the Match between Organization and Environment”, Management Science, Vol.31, 34-52.
Miller, Merton H. and Modigliani, Franco (1961), “Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal of Business, Vol. 34, 411-433.
Miller, Merton H. and Rock, Kevin (1985), “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, 1031-1051.
Modigliani, Franco and Miller, Merton H. (1963), “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction”, American Economic Review, Vol. 53, 433-443.
Morck, Randall, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1988), “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, 293-315.
Myers, Stewart C. and Majluf, Nicholas S. (1984), “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.13, 187-221.
Opler, Tim C. and Titman, Sheridan (1994), “Financial Distress and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, 1015-1040.
Pearce, John A. and Zahra, Shaker A. (1992), “Board Composition from A Strategic Contingency Perspective”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 29, 411-438.
Pi, Lynn and Timme, Stephen G. (1993), “Corporate control and bank efficiency”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.17, 515-530.
Rechner, Paula L. and Dalton, Dan R. (1991), “CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, 155-160.
Richardson, Scott (2006), “Over-investment of free cash flow”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 11, 159-189.
Rozeff, Michael S. (1982), “Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios”, Journal of Financial Research, Vol.5, 249-259.
Shen, Wei (2003), “The Dynamics of the CEO-Board Relationship: An Evolutionary Perspective”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.28, 466-476.
Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, R. W. (1986), “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Financial Management, Vol. 94, 461-488.
Singh, Manohar and Davidson III, Wallace N. (2003), “Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27, 793-816.
Smith, Clifford W. Jr. and Watts, Ross L. (1992), “The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.32, 263-292.
Stulz, René M. (1990), “Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26, 3-27.
Titman, Sheridan, Wei, K. C. John and Xie, Feixue (2004), “Capital Investments and Stock Returns”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 39, 677-700.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism”, (New York, Free Press)
Yermack, David (1996), “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, 185-211.