本篇研究檢視在沙賓法案實施後，執行長的誘因薪酬(CEO incentive pay)與內部控制缺失這兩者間的關聯性。我們使用2004年至2006年樣本資料，共計1,431個觀察值包含執行長的認股選擇權薪酬資料，內部控制缺失之揭露資料，公司與董事會特徵資料與審計委員會特徵以及執行長的特徵資料。在本篇研究中，我們的應變數為公司是否存有內部控制缺失。我們以當公司的內部控制聲明報告(SOX 302 report)或是經會計師評估之內部控制報告(SOX 404 report)中是否出現至少一個內部控制缺失做為衡量。我們的研究結果發現執行長的誘因薪酬與內部控制缺失之間，存有一個顯著正向的關係。這樣的結果指出當執行長得到越多的誘因薪酬將會增加內部控制缺失的發生機率。另外，我們引進審計委員會的特徵，藉由審計委員會的規模，獨立性，具有財務專家的成員以及審計委員會與薪酬委員會有無部份重疊來做為衡量的依據。我們使用這些衡量指標來分拆我們的樣本，如:以審計委員會成員數的平均值或是審計委員會成員有無兼任薪酬委員會成員之情形…等，來觀察執行長的誘因薪酬與內部控制缺失這兩者間的關係之變化。我們發現在具有財務專家的特徵下，當公司只有符合沙賓法案下關於財務專家之要求(SOX 407)的樣本群組，執行長的誘因薪酬與內部控制缺失存在著一個顯著正向的關係。在審計委員會成員兼任薪酬委員會成員(overlapping committee)之情形下，我們也發現當公司存有成員兼任之情形並將董事會規模控制在67%以上的區間(大於11人)，執行長的誘因薪酬與內部控制缺失會存在一個顯著正向的關係。最後，我們也分別使用依照內部控制聲明報告(SOX 302 report)與經會計師評估之內部控制報告(SOX 404 report)所揭露的內部控制缺失，做為我們的強韌性檢驗(robustness checks)，發現此測試結果與我們的實證結果一致。

This study examines the association between CEO incentive pay and internal control weakness after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We use 1,431 firms with CEO stock option, the disclosure of internal control weakness, firm and board characteristics, audit committee characteristics as well as CEO characteristics from 2004 to 2006. In this paper, we use internal control weakness (ICW) as our dependent variable from SOX 302 and 404 reports. We find that there is a significant positively between CEO incentive pay and the incidence of internal control weakness. It indicates that CEO gets more incentive pay might increase the incidence of internal control weakness. Further, we introduce the audit committee characteristic, as measured by size, independence and financial expertise as well as overlapping committee between audit committee and compensation committee. We use these measures to partition our sample into two groups to observe the change of relationship between CEO incentive pay and internal control weakness. Under the measurement of financial expertise, we find that when firms only meet the requirement of SOX 407, there is a significant positively between CEO incentive pay and the incidence of internal control weakness compared to firms over meet the requirement of SOX 407. Under the measurement of overlapping committee, we also find that if firms without overlapping committee, there is a significant positively between CEO incentive pay and the incidence of internal control weakness compared to if firms with overlapping committee after we control board size at above 67% (board members≧11). Our results are robust to the inclusion of internal control weakness under SOX 302 and 404 reporting regime.

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