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研究生: 鄭維芸
Cheng, Wei-Yun
論文名稱: 董事會監督、高階激勵薪、多角化策略
The Influence of Outside Directors, Incentive Salary for High-Rank Managers, and The Diversification Strategy, on Organizational Employment Stability.
指導教授: 陳明園
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 人力資源管理研究所在職專班
Executive Master of Human Resource Management
論文出版年: 2013
畢業學年度: 101
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 44
中文關鍵詞: 董事會監督高階激勵薪多角化策略就業穩定性
外文關鍵詞: outside directors, incentive salary, diversification strategy, employment stability
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  • 員工是經營管理者最不可欠缺的重要資源,能留住現有優秀人才同時能吸引新血投入,並經由持續不斷的重要人力資本累積,以確保企業具備有長期競爭的優勢。因此,當企業具備高度員工就業穩定性時,除了能減少因員工的流動產生的相關成本,也有助於提升公司經營績效與維持長久的競爭優勢。
    參考過去國外研究發現企業治理機制與多角化策略,對於員工的就業穩定性會造成影響,因而本研究以2008年至2011年共643家台灣上市公司為研究對象,資料取自於台灣經濟新報(TEJ)之資料庫,試圖藉由外部董事比例、高階經理人激勵薪與多角化策略探討其對員工就業穩定性之影響,以迴歸分析進行假設的檢定,研究結果顯示,外部董事比例較高時,員工就業穩定性低;高階經理人激勵薪與多角化策略對員工就業穩定性影響則不顯著。本研究進一步發現,外部董事比例、高階經理人激勵薪與多角化策略對員工就業穩定性之影響為一非線性關係,是具有雙面刃效果,在最適當程度範圍內時,員工的流動率最低,就業穩定性最佳,當超過最適程度後,員工的流動率開始上升,就業穩定性下降。最後針對本研究結果提出外部董事比例、高階經理人激勵薪與多角化策略對員工就業穩定性的實務管理之建議。


    This study examines the influence of three factors, ratio of outside directors, incentive salary for high-rank managers, and the diversification strategy, on organizational employment stability. The result indicates that the employment stability is low while the proportion of outside directors is high. It also shows that incentive salary and diversification strategy don’t have remarkable influence on organizational employment stability. Furthermore, this study found a nonlinear relationship between employment stability and those three factors. As the resign rate going up after reaching the lowest point, it reflects that ratio of outside directors, incentive salary for high-rank managers, and diversification strategy conduct double side effects on employment stability. This study has given managerial suggestions based on this result.

    第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 研究流程與架構 4 第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 5 第一節 就業穩定 5 第二節 董事會與就業穩定 6 第三節 高階經理人激勵薪與就業穩定 9 第四節 多角化策略與就業穩定 11 第三章 研究方法 13 第一節 研究架構與假說 13 第二節 研究樣本 14 第三節 變數定義 19 第四章 實證結果分析 26 第一節 研究變數的敘述性統計分析 26 第二節 迴歸結果 27 第三節 補充分析 31 第五章 結論與建議 35 第一節 研究結論與發現 35 第二節 管理意涵 37 第三節 研究限制 38 參考文獻 39

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