本研究目的欲檢驗是否在台灣，金控下券商業務是否對金控子銀行的業務有提升的效果？透過探討金控下券商建立IPO承銷關係與子銀行業務關係。同時也檢驗先前借貸關係、公司信用風險、金控主體企業對金控子銀行後續授信的影響。此外，從借款客戶的角度，觀察後續借款利差的影響因素。
　　實證結果發現，金控子銀行愈不傾向放款給自己輔導上市公司且收取較高的借款利差。對於先前已存在借款關係之企業，金控子銀行會顯著地偏好繼續與其承做放款且收取較高的借款利差。就算是其先前有借貸往來關係的公司是高風險的企業，金控子銀行還是傾向進行後續放款的動作，但是要求較低的借款利差。金控子銀行偏好承做信用評等被調升的公司且給予較低的借款利差。金控子銀行繼續承做放款，其金控主體企業以銀行為主且給予較低的借款利差。
　　就控制變數的實證結果，金控子銀行放款特徵青睞有要求擔保品且要求較高的借款利差。最後只保留先前無借貸關係的樣本，得到實證結論與先前一致。

　　The goal of this paper is to examine whether underwriting business can enhance lending business in Taiwan? This study investigates the relationship between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending business. Also, this paper examines the relationship among previous lending, borrower’s credit risk, holding‘s mother enterprise, and subsequent lending business. Finally, from borrower’s view, check subsequent loan spread.
　　The evidence shows that if a holding company underwrites the IPO of a firm, it is less likely for this holding company to provide the IPO firm with future loans and to charge higher loan spread, compared to a holding company lacking such an underwriting relationship. If a holding company has previous lending with a firm, it is more likely for this holding company to provide the firm with future loans and to charge higher loan spread. Even a risky previous firm, it is more likely for this holding company to provide the firm with future loans but to charge lower loan spread. If a firm’s TCRI upgrade, it is more likely for this holding company to provide the firm with future loans and to charge lower loan spread. If a holding company’s mother enterprise is bank, it is more likely for this holding company to provide the firm with future loans and to charge lower loan spread.
　　From the results of control variables, if loan term is collateral, it is more likely for this holding company to provide the firm with future loans and to charge higher loan spread. Results do not change significantly when the sample is restricted to firms that have exclusive post-IPO loans.

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