本文欲探討經理人薪酬對最適保險決策的影響，本文設定兩項條件來研究，第一項條件為是否存在破產風險，有破產風險表示當意外事故發生時公司會破產，預測有破產風險下經理人會傾向購買保險，降低自身承擔的風險。第二項條件為探討不同經理人薪酬制度的保險決策，預測當經理人薪酬與公司價值連結程度越高，經理人更傾向購買保險以降低承擔的風險。根據上述兩項條件變化可以分成四種情境討論。情境一為無破產風險、固定薪酬下，發現保險額度與舉債無關且不存在最適保險額度；情境二為有破產風險、固定薪酬下，經理人效用的最適保險額度是意外事故下不讓公司破產的最低保險額度，並且發現若目前舉債低於公司最適槓桿程度，則保險與舉債為替代，反之，若目前舉債高於公司最適槓桿程度，則保險額度與舉債為互補；情境三為無破產風險、浮動薪酬下，保險方面，存在最適保險額度可能為部分險或全險，舉債方面，舉債越高經理人承擔的風險需要透過購買保險降低，因此保險與舉債為互補，並且因為購買保險會減損公司價值，推論公司保險需求來自經理人自利行為，另外，和預期相同當公司績效與經理人薪酬誘因連結程度越高，公司槓桿程度會越低，反應經理人風險趨避的性質；情境四為有破產風險、浮動薪酬下，經理人效用存在最適投保額度為移除破產風險的部分險，與情境二相同舉債與保險可能互補或替代。整體而言，隨著公司破產風險、經理人薪酬的變化，保險額度和舉債的關係也會有所變動。

This article suggests that managerial compensation may be an important reason to affect insurance policy. we assume two conditions, one is probability of insolvency, the other is incentive contract. First scenario, under fixed compensation without insolvency risk, leverage is irrelevant to insurance, insurance coverage sufficient to eliminate insolvency is optimal; Second scenario, under fixed compensation with insolvency risk, if currently debt lower the optimal leverage then leverage is substitute for insurance, and vice versa；Third scenario, under incentive compensation without insolvency risk, leverage is complement for insurance, besides, manager adjust debt ratio by its own interests, incentive contract is negative correlation; Forth scenario, under incentive compensation with insolvency risk, insurance coverage sufficient to eliminate insolvency is optimal for the same reason as second scenario.

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