本文探討不同的所有權結構在有無政治聯結的狀態下，是否會對關係人交易造成影響。本文選用2008年到2015年間的數據做為樣本，來源為中國上海與深圳股票市場資訊。研究結果顯示：地方控股的國有企業對關係人交易的狀況比中央控股的國有企業嚴重。進一步探討政治聯結對地方或中央控制的國有企業的可能差異時，研究結果顯示：政治聯結對中央政府所控管的國有企業與關係人交易之關係呈正的調節效果，而對地方政府控管的國有企業則呈現負向的調節效果。

This research investigates the impact of political connections on the relationship between ownership structure and related-party transactions. The sample includes listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period of 2008-2015. The findings show that the SOEs (state-owned enterprises) controlled by local government have more serious related-party transactions than the SOEs controlled by the central government. In addition, political connections positively moderate the relationship between the SOEs controlled by the central government and related-party transactions. In contrast, political connections negatively moderate the relationship between the SOEs controlled by local governments and related-party transactions.

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