本研究認為由於機構投資者具有較高之專業知識及背景,相較於散
戶投資人對被投資公司會更具有參與公司經營及監督公司治理之能
力,故推論當機構投資人持股比例愈高,能有效抑制公司經營者對
於公司進行盈餘管理之行為。因為一般大眾投資人若會期許透過機
構投資人監督公司經營,進而降低因公司經營者進行盈餘管理致使
財務報導資訊不實所造成之權益損失,而過去多有研究指出機構投
資人係為公司治理關鍵因素之一,意即公司治理水準亦能對公司盈
餘管理程度產生影響之效果,基於我國於 2013 年推動第一次為期
五年的公司治理制度改革,故本研究將以 2008 年至 2017 年台灣上
市櫃公司之樣本資料,探討機構投資人持股比例與公司盈餘管理程
度之關聯性,以及觀察我國於 2008 至 2017 年間公司盈餘管理程度
之變化情形。

This study believes that because institutional investors have a high level of professional knowledge and background, compared with the higher ability of the general public investors to participate in the company 's
operations and supervise corporate governance .So that it is inferred that the higher the proportion of institutional investors ' shareholdings can effectively restrain the company 's operators from performing earnings management on the company. Because the general public investors will expect to supervise the company 's operations through institutional investors , thereby reducing the loss of equity caused by the misrepresentation of financial reports by the company 's earnings management. In the past , many studies have pointed out that institutional investors are corporate governance ,and because of that it is one of the
key factors ,so that the level of corporate governance considered can also have an impact on the company's earnings management.Based on Taiwan's promotion of the first five-year corporate governance reform in 2013,the study will be conducted from 2008 to 2017’s Sample data of Taiwan listed cabinet companies , to explore the relationship between the proportion of institutional investors ' shareholdings and the company 's earnings management , and to observe the changes in the degree of corporate earnings management in Taiwan between 2008 and 2017.

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5、 蔡柳卿、楊怡芳,「公司治理與符合績效門檻盈餘管理行為之
關連性研究」,東吳經濟商學學報,頁 33-72,2006。
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