美國最大能源交易商- E n r o n 的破產案之所以引人注目，不僅在於所牽涉金額的龐大，更在於此破產案的發生，暴露出內外部監理機制的失效，及引發各界對於財務報表公正性與會計師獨立性的質疑。本文主要從財務的角度切入，探討安隆如何藉由結構性交易與衍生性交易的使用，達到操縱財務報表的目的，且釐清弊端的發生是否源於交易的本質，抑或者是人為的濫用。文中也會就安隆的財務操縱手法詳加描述。此外， 由於投資銀行在安隆案中所扮演的角色倍受關注，本文也將就C i t i g r o u p 透過Y o s e m i t e t r u s t 所發行、與安隆信用相連結的信用連結債券的契約內容及實際資金的運用情形進行介紹，說明C i t i g r o u p 如何藉由該類衍生性商品的使用，管理其對安隆的信用暴險； 又該債券如何淪為安隆操縱盈餘的工具。文章最後， 將就安隆對結構性交易的使用所牽涉到的會計議題、關係人交易與揭露議題加以探討。台灣隨著金融環境的開放， 預期未來將會有越來越多結構性交易的出現， 因此， 如何從安隆案中學得經驗， 防止類似弊案的再度發生， 將是不可忽視的議題。

Enron, the biggest US energy trader, whose swift descent into bankruptcy has raised numerous questions, including corporate governance, the proper expression of financial statements and the independence of external auditor.The purpose of this article is to illustrate how Enron used the structured transaction and derivatives to manipulate the accounting earnings and to clarify
what the fraud resulted from. Because of Enron’s Collapse, the roles of the financial institutions come into the focus of Senate’s investigation. This article would also describe the contract details of one credit linked note-Series 1999-A
LEO, which linked to Enron’s obligation and be issued by Yosemite trust and explain how this kind of credit derivative helps Citigroup manage it’s credit exposure and illustrate how the structure of the note aided Enron in hiding debt
and inflating the operating cash flow. Finally we would discuss the accounting issue and related-party transaction disclosure issues involved in Enron’s structured transaction and trace the following development of these issues. As Taiwan’s financial environment becomes more and more open, the structured transactions are expected to be prevailing in the future. To learn from Enron’s case and prevent similar fraud from happening is a worth noting topic.

一、英文部分
1.Bratton, William W., 2002, Enron and the dark side of shareholder value,
Tulane Law Review, The George Washington University Law School.
2.Credit Derivatives ：Applications for Risk Management, Investment and
portfolio optimization, published by Risk Books, a special division of Risk
Publications.
3.Deloitte & Touche, 2002, Consolidation of certain SPEs ； Proposed
Interpretation of ARB NO. 51.
4.Enron Annual Report （2000 ）
5.Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation,
2003, FASB Interpretation No. 46：Consolifation of Variable interest Entities, Financial Accounting Series .
6.Gillan, Stuart L., and John D.Martin, 2003, Financial Engineering, Corporate
Governance, and the Collapse of Enron, University of Delaware - Center for
Corporate Governance and Baylor University - Hankamer School of Business: Finance, Insurance & Real Estate Working Paper.
7.International Swaps and derivatives Association 17 th Annual General Meeting
Berlin, 2002, Enron：Corporate Failure, market Success.
8.Linklaters & Alliance, 2000, Repackaging Transactions: The Legal Framework.
9.Partnoy, Frank., 2002, Enron and Derivatives, Testimony, Hearings before the
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
10.Powers, William Jr., 2002, Report of Investigation By the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.
11.Roach, Robert., 2002, The Role of the Financial Institutions In Enron''s
Collapse, Testimony, Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
12.Roach, Robert., 2002, Accounting Treatment of Prepays; Effect of Enron’s
Financial Statement, Testimony Appendix A, Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
13.Roach, Robert., 2002, Knowledge and Participation of Financial Institutions in Enron Prepays, Testimony Appendix B, Hearings before the United States
Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
14.Roach, Robert., 2002, Citigroup Case History, Testimony Appendix D,
Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
15.Roach, Robert., 2002, Summary of Enron "Prepays" with J.P. Morgan Chase
and Citigroup, Testimony Appendix E, Hearings before the United States
Senate Committee on Governmental Affair.
16.Schwarcz, Steven L., 2003, Securitization Post-Enron, Cardozo Law Review
Symposium Issue on “Threats to Asset-Based Finance”.
17.Schwarcz, Steven L., 2002, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose
Entities in Corporate Structures, University of Cincinnati Law Review,
Symposium Issue.
18.Tolk, Jeffrey., 2001, Understanding the risks in credit default swaps,
FOW/Credit derivatives.
19.U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff Report, 2002,
Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot：Four Transactions Funded and
Facilitated By U.S. Financial Institutions.
20.Yosemite Securities Trust I 8.25% Series 1999-A Linked Enron Obligations
(LEOs SM ) due 2004 contract.
二、中文部分
1.王柏祥(民89)，「信用交換契約的評價與應用」，國立台灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。
2.朱應舞（民91），「任重道遠的美國企業革新法案」，會計研究月刊，第202期，頁18-29
3.何思湘(民91)「美國安隆公司倒閉事件對我國相關立法之啟示」， 會計研究月刊，第199 期，頁17-28
4.林柄滄（民91）「安隆(Enron)破產事件引發的會計危機」，會計研究月刊，第195 期，頁21-28
5.林柄滄（民91），「SPE 是啥玩意兒」，會計研究月刊，第196 期，頁28-32
6.陳依蘋（民91），「美國史上最大破產案-安隆（Enron）深度報導」，會計研究月刊，第195 期，頁15-20
7.陳依蘋（民91），「革新法案真能革新？」，會計研究月刊，第202 期，頁14-17
8.馮萌,蔣衛平（民91）,「安然公司特殊目的實體（SPEs）解讀」
9.黃金澤(民91)「Enron 案省思-會計及揭露」，會計研究月刊，第196 期，頁33-42
三、網址
【1】http://account.jscj.com/jscj/yanjiu/data/20030126154851.htm
【2】http://govt-aff.senate.gov/121102report.pdf
【3】http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2002-01-14/443365.html
【4】http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/General%20Requirements(1).pdf
【5】http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf
【6】http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302roach.pdf
【7】http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302roach_a.pdf
【8】http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302roach_b.pdf
【9】http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302roach_c.pdf
【10】http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302roach_e.pdf