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研究生: 林慧珍
Hui-Chun Lin
論文名稱: 公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及其績效之影響-研發密集產業之實證
指導教授: 洪榮華
Jung-Hua Hung
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理學系
Department of Business Administration
畢業學年度: 91
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 86
中文關鍵詞: 董事會特性股權結構創新策略多角化策略公司績效Tobin’s q
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  • 研發密集產業具有高風險高報酬之特性,使得公司管理階層偏好採行多角化策略以分散職位風險,但股東郤偏好創新策略以極大化個人財富,而可能產生股東與經理人策略選擇上的利益衝突。本研究基於董事會具有決策控制功能的理論,認為公司內部治理機制具有策略控制功能,而足以影響公司之承擔風險的程度,再者,不同的策略取向也可能影響公司表現,而產生不同的績效結果。因此本研究以策略變數為中介變數,將研究模型設計為公司治理機制-策略-績效架構,以研發密集產業進行驗證。
    此外,由於策略效果具有時間落後的特性,因此將本研究架構設計為前後期模型,期使模型更為合理。本研究之公司治理機制含括董事會特性及股權結構,而公司策略為創新策略及多角化策略,並且分別從總資產報酬率及Tobin’s q兩指標,瞭解公司治理機制或策略對公司財務面及價值面的影響。茲將研究結果說明如下:
    一、創新策略
    在董事會特性方面,董事長兼任總經理有助於公司採行創新策略、外部董事相對比例高郤對創新策略有負向影響。在股權結構方面,僅股權集中度對創新策略有顯著正向影響。而創新策略則如預期對Tobin’s q 有顯著正向影響,但對ROA郤沒有顯著影響,其影響方向未定。
    二、多角化策略
    在第一階段,本研究以Rumelt(1974)所提出專業比率、相關比率及產業賀芬德指數予以衡量產銷集中度,發現董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理皆不利於公司集中專業生產。而經理人持股比率愈高,有助於公司集中生產或發展相關事業。至於多角化對公司表現的影響,不論以ROA或以Tobin’s q 為衡量指標,非相關多角化策略對公司一律有損於公司表現。
    三、中介效果
    不論是ROA模型或Tobin’s模型,加入策略變數後均達到解釋力增量顯著性。在ROA模型,策略變數維持對ROA的影響力,而公司治理機制變數也沒有降低,策略的中介效果不獲支持。在Tobin’s模型,公司治理機制變數,因策略因素加入,對Tobin’s q的影響力隨時間遞移而逐漸減弱,部份支持策略的中介效果。


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    第壹章 緒言 1 第貳章 文獻探討 3 第一節 我國公司治理監控機制與功能之法定基礎 4 第二節 公司治理機制與公司策略-董事會決策控制功能 8 第三節 公司策略選擇-多角化策略、創新策略 9 第四節 創新策略 13 第五節 研發密集產業 15 第參章 研究假說與方法 17 第一節 研究架構 17 第二節 研究假說 18 第三節 研究方法及變數定義 34 第肆章 實證結果與分析 44 第一節 基本敘述性統計 44 第二節 相關與比較 48 第三節 迴歸分析 53 第伍章 結論與建議 69 第一節 研究結論 69 第二節 研究限制 72 第三節 後續研究建議 72 附錄一 中華徵信所選取集團企業標準 74 附錄二 多元迴歸分析-當期關係 75 附錄三 專業化比率(SR)、相關比率(RR)加入產業虛擬變數的結果 77

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