本研究主要探討公司經理人若具有樂觀傾向，是否會影響公司從事股票股回政策的可能性，並加入家族企業因素，探討家族企業與非家族企業是否由於樂觀傾向的不同而影響公司股票購回政策；本研究以2001年至2007年間台灣上市、上櫃公司為樣本，主要資料來源為台灣經濟新報資料庫，並利採用邏輯式迴歸(Logit regression)分析方法；實證結果發現，公司經理人若具有樂觀傾向，會主觀地對公司價值錯誤定價(Mispricing)，認為市場低估公司證券價值，而增加股票購回活動的可能性；而在台灣的家族企業，實證結果發現相較於非家族企業，家族企業較不會從事股票購回政策；因此本論文進一步探討，發現家族企業相較於非家族企業較不會從事股票購回，有部分原因是由於家族企業經理人較不具樂觀傾向。
此外，為了解家族企業較不具樂觀傾向的主要原因，本論文進一步探討家族企業內部，探討家族CEO與非家族CEO之個人特質與差異；結果發現，家族企業較不會從事股票購回，可能是由於家族內的非家族CEO相較於家族CEO較不具有樂觀傾向，而降低家族企業從事股票購回的可能性。

The purpose of this research is to investigate how the managerial optimism influences the stock repurchase program. Our research also tries to explore that the relationship between family businesses and stock repurchases is affected by managerial optimism. Our research sample contains Taiwanese listed and OTC firms from 2001 to 2007 and information on all relevant financial variables is available in the Taiwan Economic Journal(TEJ) Database. Using the Logit regression model, the results indicate that optimistic managers tend to believe their securities to be underestimated by the market, that is, they perceive market mispricing, which stimulates the stock repurchase program more likely to be conducted. In addition, our research finds that family businesses comparing with non-family businesses would be less likely to execute stock repurchase program. One of the reasons is that managers in the family businesses are less optimistic.
Furthermore, our research also studies the personal characteristics of the family CEOs and the non-family CEOs in family businesses, the results indicate that why the family businesses would be less likely to execute stock repurchase program than non-family businesses is that non-family CEOs in the family businesses may be less optimistic than family CEOs.

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