本研究探討投資人情緒對會計保守性之影響；以往相關研究多為投資人情緒與公司之揭露政策間的關聯性，本研究以此類研究為基礎，觀察與公司揭露政策息息相關的會計保守性是否亦會受到投資人情緒之影響。本研究使用三種衡量會計保守性之方法，分別為市場基礎、應計基礎以及盈餘不對稱反應等模型。實證結果顯示，投資人情緒越高，公司之會計保守性越高；顯示公司不希望公司股價因市場情緒而過於偏離其應有價值，因此在投資人情緒高時，會希望透過更加保守之會計緩和股價偏離的現象。

This study investigates the impact of investor sentiment on accounting conservatism; previous studies focused on be investigating the association between investor sentiment and disclosure policy. This study is base on those previous studies, examining whether accounting conservatism, which is highly related with disclosure policy, will also be influenced by investor sentiment. This study uses three conservatism measures: market-based measure, and accrual-based measure, and measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings. This results showed that firms with higher investor sentiment have higher accounting conservatism.

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