| 研究生: |
包世瑛 Shih-Ying Pao |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
企業社會責任與政治獻金之關聯 |
| 指導教授: | 黃承祖 |
| 口試委員: | |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 企業管理學系 Department of Business Administration |
| 論文出版年: | 2021 |
| 畢業學年度: | 109 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 84 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 政商關係 、政治獻金 、企業社會責任 、ESG |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Political-business relationship, political contributions, corporate social responsibility, ESG |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:15 下載:0 |
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本研究主要探討負面企業社會責任的企業是否會投注較多資金以建立政商關係,當企業違反企業社會責任事件較多時,是否會將資金投資在政治捐獻上,藉由政治影響力減輕負面形象造成的傷害。本研究利用臺灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)中上市櫃企業財務數據與MSCI資料庫中ESG評分資訊,以及2005年至2020年立委選舉之政治獻金資料,來檢視企業社會責任與政治獻金之間的關聯性。實證結果顯示,企業社會責任裁罰金額較多的企業,捐贈政治獻金給立委的意願較高,且不同產業違反企業社會責任的構面有所不同;從社會責任表現(ESG分數)來衡量,社會責任表現較好的企業,其捐贈政治獻金的意願較低。另外本研究檢測家族企業的調節效果,研究結果顯示家族企業對裁罰金額與政治獻金之關係具正向調節效果,然而家族企業對社會責任表現與政治獻金關係之負向調節效果不顯著。
This study mainly explores whether companies with negative corporate social responsibility establish a political-business relationship. Because corporate social responsibility can be regarded as a long-term intangible asset, and political contributions are short-term intangible assets, when there are many incidents of corporate social responsibility violations, whether to use funds Invest in contributions to the political figures. This study uses the financial data of listed companies in the Taiwan Economic News Database (TEJ) and the ESG score information in the MSCI database, as well as the data of political contributions from the legislative elections from 2005 to 2020, to corporate social responsibility and political contributions explore.
The results demonstrate that companies with a large amount of corporate social responsibility fines are more likely to donate political contributions to legislators, and different industries have different aspects of violating corporate social responsibility. However, companies with higher ESG scores are less willing to donate political contributions. In addition, this study tests whether family businesses are more likely to donate political contributions. The results show that when these businesses have more social responsibility penalties, they tend to establish political connections by donating political contributions. However, the higher ESG score of family companies, it may not be more willing to make political donations.
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