| 研究生: |
陳宥竹 You-Chu Chen |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
企業重整中的債權順位保障與經濟效率平衡—以絕對優先原則為核心的比較探討 Balancing Creditor Priority Protection and Economic Efficiency in Corporate Reorganization: A Comparative Study Centered on the Absolute Priority Rule |
| 指導教授: |
鄭有為
Yu-Wei Cheng |
| 口試委員: | |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 產業經濟研究所 Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics |
| 論文出版年: | 2025 |
| 畢業學年度: | 113 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 114 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 公司重整 、美國聯邦破產法 、重整計畫 、絕對優先原則 、債權順位 、債權人與股東 、經濟效率 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Corporate Reorganization, United States Bankruptcy Code, Reorganization Plan, Absolute Priority Rule, Priority of Claims, Creditors and Shareholders, Economic Efficiency |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:34 下載:0 |
| 分享至: |
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我國現行公司法第五章第十節所設立之公司重整制度,旨在提供有財務困難的企業得以重建再生、再續營運的法律途徑,避免走向破產結束營業。然而,在實務的運作上,關於重整計畫中如何進行利益的分配,特別是債權人和股東之間的清償順序,現行法規範上尚屬模糊,亦未明文採行「絕對優先原則」(Absolute Priority Rule)。此一缺口可能損害債權人在法律上應有的優先受償權益,亦不利於重整制度的公信力,引發程序濫用的疑慮。
本文首先聚焦在美國聯邦破產法第十一章的重整制度,分析其如何透過分組表決、強制認可機制,確保債權清償順位與資本結構正義,並透過「新價值例外」平衡原股東參與企業重整的機會。進而,本文針對我國企業環境之特性,特別是家族企業比例高、資本結構集中等因素,探討此類企業結構對實施絕對優先原則可能產生的影響與挑戰。
除法制設計外,本文亦從經濟學角度進行分析,指出明確的清償規則有助於降低資訊不對稱、強化協商預測性,進而提升整體資源配置效率與誘因一致性。絕對優先原則不僅提升債權保護,亦有助於建立制度信賴、降低交易成本,實現企業重整法制的經濟功能。
本文主張,我國公司法應適度考量引進絕對優先原則,以補足現行制度上對債權保障與經濟效率的不足,並嘗試提出具體修法建議,包括增訂債權順位條文、引入新價值例外機制、健全重整價值評估程序並搭配過渡條款以利彈性適用。期待透過優化制度的設計,提升重整程序的公平公正性、透明性與可預測性,建立信賴基礎,促進企業重整,並與國際重整法制接軌,實現程序與實質經濟功能的目標。
The current corporate reorganization mechanism in Chapter V, Section 10 of our country’s Company Act is designed to provide a legal pathway for financially distressed companies to rebuild and resume operations, thereby avoiding liquidation and business termination. However, in practice, the statutory framework remains vague regarding the distribution of interests under a reorganization plan—particularly the order of payment between creditors and shareholders. Notably, the current law does not explicitly adopt the “Absolute Priority Rule”, a doctrinal principle that requires senior class of creditors to be fully satisfied a value equal to the allowed amount of the claims before any junior class, including shareholders, can receive any distribution. This legislative gap may undermine creditors’ legally entitled priority rights, reduce the credibility of the reorganization process, and create potential for procedural abuse.
First, this paper examines the U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization system under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, focusing on how it enforces the priority of claims and capital structure fairness through classified voting and cramdown confirmation mechanisms, while allowing limited flexibility for shareholders’ participation via the “new value exception.” Building on this comparative foundation, the paper then analyzes the unique characteristics of our country’s corporate landscape, especially the prevalence of family-owned businesses and highly-concentrated ownership structures, and how these features might affect the feasibility and implementation of Absolute Priority Rule.
In addition to legal framework design, this study also conducts an analysis from an economic perspective, highlighting that clear rules of distribution help reduce asymmetrical information and enhance the predictability of negotiations, thereby improving overall resource allocation efficiency and aligning stakeholder incentives. The Absolute Priority Rule not only strengthens creditor protection but also contributes to building institutional trust, reducing transaction costs, and realizing the economic functions of a corporate reorganization regime.
This study maintains that our country’s Company Act should consider introducing the Absolute Priority Rule to strengthen both creditor protection and institutional economic efficiency, fill the current legal ambiguity. It proposes a set of concrete legislative reforms, including the codification of claim priority, incorporation of a new value exception mechanism, enhancement of valuation procedures for reorganization plans, and the design of transitional provisions to ensure flexible adaptation. Through these institutional improvements, the reorganization process in our country may be made more fair, transparent, and predictable. It is hoped that it could reinforce procedural legitimacy, facilitate successful corporate reorganization, and align our country’s legal framework with international insolvency standards.
中文文獻
專書
1. 毛慶生、朱敬一、林全、許松根、陳添枝、陳思寬、黃朝熙,經濟學,華泰文化,2012年5月。
2. 王文宇,公司法論,元照,2018年10月。
3. 柯芳枝,公司法論(下),三民書局,2014年9月。
4. 劉連煜,現代公司法,新學林,2021年9月。
5. 鄭有為,破產法學的美麗新世界,元照,2008年2月。
6. 鄭有為,現代破產法,元照,2023年1月。
7. 謝易宏,昨是今非:企業與金融的法思拾掇,元照,2012年。
8. 羅建勛,公司如何重整,永然文化,1992年9月。
專書論文集
1. 王文宇,從經濟觀點論我國公司重整制度,新金融法,元照,2003年1月。
期刊文獻
1. 王文宇,契約法釋義學應納入經濟分析觀點,月旦律評,第12期,2023年3月。
2. 王志誠,企業組織再造彈性化之政策取向與課題,國立中正大學法學集刊,第11期,2003年4月。
3. 林群弼,由比較法之觀點論我國現行公司重整之規定,臺大法學論叢,第34卷第1期,2005年1月。
4. 張力、侯啟娉、林翠蓉、許蕙欣,公司治理結構與股東常會可接近性之關係,臺大管理論叢,第24卷第2期,2014年6月。
5. 張永健,物權法之經濟分析導論(一)──事前觀點與交易成本,月旦法學雜誌,第230期,2014年7月。
6. 許杏宜,解散還是重整?談企業的退場機制,會計研究月刊,第374期,2017年1月。
7. 黃帥升、陳文智,無擔保債權人於重整程序中之困境,會計研究月刊,第357期,2015年8月。
8. 鄭有為,論自願性重整──兼論對司法院債務清理法草案重整章的幾點觀察與建議,臺北大學法學論叢,第113期,2020年3月。
學位論文
1. 郝月葵,論破產程序中「進行中雙務契約」之處理—以智慧財產權授權契約為中心,國立中央大學產業經濟研究所碩士論文,2005年7月。
2. 章郁佳,企業重整法制之研究—從公司重整到法人重整之理論變遷,國立成功大學法律學系碩士班碩士論文,2008年12月。
3. 陳夏毅,公司重整程序中法院扮演的角色-由比較法角度評釋我國公司重整法制實務見解之妥適性,國立台北大學法律學系研究所碩士論文,2007年7月。
4. 黃亦琪,論中小企業之重整法制架構,東吳大學法學院法律系碩士班碩士論文,2022年1月。
法規函釋與裁判
1. 公司法,2021年12月29日。
2. 司法院釋字第106號解釋。
3. 臺灣士林地方法院99年度整第5號民事裁定。
4. 臺灣桃園地方法院108年度整抗字第2號裁定。
5. 臺灣高等法院92年度重上字第518號民事裁定。
6. 臺灣臺北地方法院93年度整字第1號裁定。
7. 臺灣臺北地方法院96年度整抗字第6號裁定。
8. 臺灣臺北地方法院96年度整抗字第7號裁定。
9. 臺灣臺北地方法院97年度整字第6號裁定。
10. 臺灣臺北地方法院98年度整抗字第2號裁定。
政府公報
1. 第一屆立法院第三十五會期第二十八次會議議案關係文書。
其他資料
1. 大江國際股份有限公司民國九十三年上半年度財務報表暨查核報告。
網頁資料
1. Goodinfo!台灣股市資訊網,8315大江國際年度資產負債表(個別),https://goodinfo.tw/tw/StockFinDetail.asp?RPT_CAT=BS_YEAR&LAST_RPT_CAT=BS_YEAR&STOCK_ID=8315&QRY_TIME=2004。
2. iThome,大眾電信破產成定局,盼中華電信暫時接管,https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/93267#:~:text=Image%3A%20%E5%A4%A7%E7%9C%BE%E9%9B%BB%E4%BF%A1%E5%B8%B8%E9%A7%90%E9%87%8D%E6%95%B4%E4%BA%BA%E6%9A%A8%E8%91%A3%E4%BA%8B%E9%95%B7%E5%BC%B5%E6%95%8F%E7%8E%89。
3. THENEWSLENS.COM關鍵評論,PHS走入歷史...大眾電信正式宣告破產,https://www.thenewslens.com/article/10802。
4. 台灣法學會,「公司重整、債務調整與強制執行法律問題之探討」座談會記錄,http://taiwanlawsociety.org.tw/index_event1.html。
5. 司法院,裁判書查詢,裁判書系統,https://judgment.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/default.aspx。
6. 立法院,委員動態:看!又是「司法大鯨魚」吃「平民小蝦米」!(刊載者:蔡啟芳委員),http://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=4897&pid=10357。
7. 百鴻未上市股票資訊網,大江國際股份有限公司-股東權益,https://www.hung168.tw/cmpany_se.php?STID=99794#:~:text=%E5%A4%A7%E6%B1%9F%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B%E8%82%A1%E4%BB%BD%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8,04%E5%81%9C%E6%AD%A2%E4%B8%8A%E6%AB%83。
8. 國家通訊傳播委員會,NCC針對報載「大眾電信 聲請重整」提出說明-歷史資料,https://www.ncc.gov.tw/Chinese/news_detail.aspx?site_content_sn=8&cate=0&keyword=&is_history=1&pages=97&sn_f=7476#。
9. 經理人,台灣企業近7成是家族治理,且多數未經歷過接班!何時該啟動交接計畫?,https://www.managertoday.com.tw/articles/view/68899?utm_source=copyshare。
英文文獻
專書
1. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3D DICT. OF BANKR. TERMS § A05.
2. DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., BANKRUPTCY (10th ed. 2015).
3. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY (1993).
4. HON. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III, NANCY F. MACLEAN, 6B WEST'S FED. FORMS, BANKRUPTCY COURTS § 13:115.50 (5th ed.).
5. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2012).
期刊文獻
1. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1991).
2. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5 (1995).
3. David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today's United States Bankruptcy Court and Its Judicial Officers, 9 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 165 (2000).
4. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 393 (1999).
5. Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785 (2017).
6. Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 9 (1992).
7. James B. Haines Jr & Philip J. Hendel, No Easy Answers: Small Business Bankruptcies After Bapcpa, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 71 (2005).
8. Karen M. Gebbia, The Keepers of the Code: Evolution of the Bankruptcy Community, 91 Am. Bankr. L.J. 183 (2017).
9. Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1919).
10. Marvin E. Jacob, Pamela B. Corrie, Una M. O'Boyle, An Analysis of the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Relating to Cases Administered Under Chapter 11, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 339 (1995).
11. Ralph Brubaker, The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 39 No. 10 Bankruptcy Law Letter NL 1 (Oct. 2019).
12. Robert J. Keach & Adam R. Prescott, Balancing Act: How the Small Business Reorganization Act Facilitates Successful Reorganizations (And How Judicial “Re-balancing” Could Affect That Success), 31 No. 6 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. NL Art. 1
13. Thomas E. Carlson & Jennifer Frasier Hayes, The Small Business Provisions of The 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 645 (2005).
14. William L. Norton III & James B. Bailey, The Pros and Cons of the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 36 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 383 (2020).
法規與判決
1. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
2. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1939).
3. In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003).
4. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2013).
5. In re Crowe, 2021 WL 2212005 (Bkrtcy.D.Ariz., 2021).
6. In re Dutch Woodcraft Shops, 14 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1935).
7. In re Johnson, 2021 WL 825156 (Bkrtcy N.D. Tex. 2021).
8. In re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019).
9. In re Sullivan, 626 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2021).
10. In re Thurmon, 625 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2020).
11. In re Wright, 2020 WL 2193240 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2020).
12. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New York, 271 U.S. 445 (U.S., 1926).
13. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674 (U.S. 1899).
14. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
15. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
16. Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA) of 2019, Pub. L. No. 11654, 133 Stat. 1079
17. Sundby v. Marquee Funding Group, Inc., 2020 WL 5535357 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
18. The Bankruptcy Act of 1994.
19. The Bankruptcy Act of 2005.
20. Title 11 of the United States Code (2005).
21. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
網頁資料
1. American Bankruptcy Institute, Bankruptcy Statistics(Quarterly Non-business Filings by Chapter), at https://abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics.
2. Investopedia, Welfare Economics Explained: Theory, Assumptions, and Criticism, at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/welfare_economics.asp#:~:text=What%20Is%20Welfare%20Economics%3F.
3. Jones Day, Keeping It in the Family: Bankruptcy Court Discusses Factors for Application of New Value Exception to Absolute Priority Rule, at https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2024/03/keeping-it-in-the-family-bankruptcy-court-discusses-factors-for-application-of-new-value-exception-to-absolute-priority.
4. Lexology, What Is the Absolute Priority Rule and How Does It Affect Payment on My Claim In Chapter 11 Bankruptcy?, at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c8818fb7-0a38-4ea4-a32c-7f7da9a36f4f#:~:text=What%20Is%20the%20Absolute%20Priority,for%20lower%20priority%20claims.
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, Celebrating 70 years of service to America's small businesses, at https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/organization/observances/celebrating-70-years-service-americas-small-businesses.
6. United States Courts, Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, at https://www.uscourts.gov/court-programs/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics.