本文探討當產品存在網路外部性時，在共營廠商與利潤廠商從事Cournot競爭雙占市場下的競爭分析。在產品可能相容或不相容的情況下，我們分析工資、固定成本及技術變動對於廠商決策與市場均衡的影響。本文主要的結論如下。在產品相容時，若利潤廠商面對的市場工資提高時，其產量會降低，但對共營廠商產量的影響則不確定；共營廠商的固定成本提高時會使其產量增加，但對利潤廠商的產量影響則不確定；利潤廠商技術進步會使其產量會增加，但對共營廠商的產量影響則不確定。在產品不相容時，利潤廠商面對的市場工資提高與技術進步，對兩廠商的產量影響都不確定。

This paper discusses the Cournot competition between a profit-maximizing firm (henceforth PM firm) and a labor-managed firm (LM firm) when exists network externality. We assume that the two firms produce homogenous products. Besides, they can produce either compatible or incompatible ones. Each consumer can buy one product at most from these firms. We analysis the production decision effects and market equilibrium when firms face the change of wage, fixed cost and technical improvement.
Our main findings are as follows: 1. In the compatible case, if market wage rate increases, the quantities of PM firm will decrease, but it’s undetermined for LM firm.
2. If LM firm increases fixed cost, it will increase its quantities, but the effect of PM firm is ambiguous. 3. If PM firm has a technical improvement, it will increase its quantities, but it’s undetermined for LM firm. 4. In the incompatible case, if PM firm faces the increased market wage rate, the quantity is undetermined for all the two firms.

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