本研究延續Flannery and Rangan（2006）以及王元章與林憲平(2015)之研究結果，以2012年至2023年為研究期間，共挑選62間上市、上櫃之生技醫療公司作為研究對象，並選用多個財務特徵變數、公司特徵變數以及公司治理變數作為影響動態資本結構調整之因素，同時，分別以三種不同定義之負債比率（MDR1、MDR2、MDR3）以及動態資本結構調整模型，探討生技醫療產業之最適資本結構、資本結構調整速度及行為。
實證結果顯示，台灣生技醫療產業的企業在資本結構上具備顯著的動態調整行為，支持動態權衡理論，其調整速度介於46.6%至53.8%，高於既有台灣文獻估計之28%，反映出該產業公司資本結構調整相對積極。
此外，公司未來的成長性、研發費用之揭露與股權結構對於其資本結構的決策有重要影響：市場評價較高之企業傾向降低槓桿；揭露研發費用的公司展現出較低的負債比率；股權越集中的企業，則越願意提高負債比率。
本研究進一步依據企業的負債水準進行分組，分析其目標負債比率偏離程度與次期帳面負債變動之間的關係。次高負債水準的組別調整動機最強；最低與次低負債組受限於融資條件或反應選擇性，動態調整較不明顯；最高負債水準的組別則與先前的研究結果調整方向不一致。結果顯示台灣生技醫療產業之企業調整其負債比率的傾向，會受到現有負債水準的影響，但企業即使存在偏離，仍可能因市場摩擦或其他限制而無法進行有效調整。

This study builds on Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Wang and Lin (2015), examining the dynamic adjustment of capital structure in Taiwan’s biotechnology and healthcare industry. The sample includes 62 listed and over-the-counter (OTC) firms over the period from 2012 to 2023. Adjustment speeds are estimated under three definitions of market debt ratio (MDR1, MDR2, MDR3), incorporating financial, firm-specific, and governance variables.
The findings support the dynamic trade-off theory, with adjustment speeds ranging from 46.6% to 53.8%, higher than the prior study’s 28%, suggesting that firms in this industry tend to adjust their capital structures more actively.
Furthermore, firms’ future growth potential, R&D disclosure, and ownership structure are found to significantly influence capital structure decisions. Firms with higher market valuation tend to maintain lower leverage; R&D expenditure disclosure shows lower debt ratios; and firms with more concentrated ownership are more willing to increase leverage.
This study further categorizes firms by debt levels to examine the relationship between deviations from target leverage and subsequent changes in book leverage. Firms in the second-highest debt group show the strongest adjustment incentives. In contrast, firms in the lowest and second-lowest groups face financing constraints or display selective responses, leading to weaker adjustments. Firms in the highest debt group show adjustment behaviors inconsistent with prior findings. Overall, leverage adjustments in Taiwan’s biotech and healthcare firms are influenced by current debt levels, though market frictions and other constraints may hinder effective adjustment even when deviations exist.

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