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研究生: 王楨媛
Chen-yuan Wang
論文名稱: 通路競爭與營收分享合約下之最佳定價與訂購量
Optimal pricing and ordering decisions under channel competition and revenue sharing contract
指導教授: 陳振明
Jen-Ming Chen
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 工業管理研究所
Graduate Institute of Industrial Management
畢業學年度: 97
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 63
中文關鍵詞: 通路合約寄售營收分享價格競爭
外文關鍵詞: price competition, consignment sales, revenue sharing
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  • 本論文研究主要考慮一個兩階層配銷通路,由兩個競爭供應商及一個零售商
    組成,兩個供應商間的競爭為價格上的競爭,其產品具有替代性,並反應於需求函數上面,需求水準受供應商自身定價及競爭對手價格影響及非價格因素的隨機因子,供應商及零售商間存在著Stackelberg game領導者及跟隨者的關係,在不同情境下,分別以通路總利潤、通路成員利潤最大化為目標,來分析及觀察在集權通路、營收分享加寄售合約及分散式通路三個情境下,其最佳決策為何,並藉此了解在環境參數的不同架構下,對於決策變數及通路利潤之影響為何。
    透過推導及在數值上驗證集權模型與營收分享模型之最佳價格間的關係,發現當營收分享比例大於(等於或小於)零售商占通路總成本比例時,營收分享模型最佳價格大於(等於或小於)集權模型最佳價格。此外,得知在不同營收分享比例下,零售商及供應商間的利潤分配狀態,並觀察到參數變化對於模型決策及利潤的影響程度,如:在營收分享模型及及分散式模型中,當價格交叉彈性、市場規模、成本參數(通路總成本、生產成本)增加皆會使得供應商提高其價格。


    In this study, we consider a two-echelon supply chain, consisted of two competing suppliers and one retailer. There’s price competition existed between two suppliers and reflected on the demand function, where the demand is affected by the price of one of the suppliers itself and the other’s price as well. Also, the two suppliers’ products are substitutes. Under different scenarios, the suppliers and the retailer act as Stackelberg leader and follower in turn and intend to maximize their own profits or the supply chain’s total profit. We observe the optimal decisions of these scenarios, such as Centralized Model, Revenue Sharing Model, and Decentralized Model. Furthermore, we try to give the insight into the sensitivity of the optimal decisions and the channel’s total profit under the variations of system parameters.
    We observe the relation between the optimal price of centralized model and the optimal price of revenue sharing model theoretically and verify it numerically. Also, we present the profit allocation between the retailer and suppliers with different revenue sharing proportions. Finally, we gain the insight into the effect of the variations of system parameters on the optimal decisions and the channel’s total profit, such as the optimal price would rise as the system parameters, like cross-price elasticity, total channel cost, and market size increase.

    中文摘要 i 英文摘要 ii 目錄 iii 圖目錄............................................................................................................................v 表目錄...........................................................................................................................vi 第一章 緒論 1 1.1研究背景及動機 1 1.2 研究目的 2 1.3 研究架構 3 第二章 文獻回顧 5 2.1 營收分享文獻 5 2.2 寄售合約文獻 10 2.3 價格競爭文獻 11 第三章 模型分析 13 3.1 模型情境描述 13 3.2 模型假設與符號說明 14 3.2.1 模型假設 14 3.2.2 符號說明 15 3.3 模型分析 16 3.3.1 集權式通路模型(Centralized Model) 16 3.3.2 營收分享模型(Revenue Sharing Model) 18 3.3.3 分散式通路模型(Decentralized Model) 20 第四章 數值分析 24 4.1 參數設定 24 4.2 營收分享模型之敏感度分析 25 4.2.1營收分享比例r與庫存因子Zi及Zj的組合 25 4.2.2 不同r及α下,營收分享模型定價及集權通路定價的關係 28 4.2.3 供應商價格與Zi 、Di及 Qi之關係 29 4.2.4 價格交叉彈性 31 4.2.5 市場規模 33 4.2.6 通路總成本 35 4.3 分散式模型之敏感度分析 37 4.3.1 生產成本 37 4.3.2 價格交叉彈性 40 4.3.3 市場規模 42 第五章 結論及未來研究方向 45 5.1 結論 45 5.2 未來研究方向 46 參考文獻 47 附錄一 數值分析數據 50

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