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研究生: 林吟盈
Yin Ying
論文名稱: 中國股權分置改革對於股利政策影響之研究
Split share structure reform and dividend payout policy
指導教授: 洪榮華
Jung Hua Hung
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理學系
Department of Business Administration
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 62
中文關鍵詞: 公司治理型二代理問題現金股利股權分置改革
外文關鍵詞: corporate governance, type Ⅱ agency problem, cash dividend payout, split share structure reform
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  • 中國大陸政府於2005年實施股權分置改革,以達到資本市場效率性、與國際接軌以吸引外資,以及改善公司治理等目的。本研究從股利偏好及利益輸送之代理問題觀點,以現金股利發放水準之變化來檢視股權分置改革的成效。實證結果發現,股權分置改革後,現金股利發放明顯降低,原因是股權分置改革使得控制股東利用現金股利發放進行利益輸送的現象改善,也就是型二代理問題減輕,而本研究也更進一步發現在公司治理機制的部分,股權分置改革所導致流通股以及外國投資人持股比例的增加對於型二代理問題的降低影響最為顯著。此外,本文也分別檢視國家股、法人股、外資股,及個人股四類公司受到股權分置改革影響的程度,結果發現從改善型二代理問題的角度觀之,股權分置改革在法人股公司的成效最為明顯。


    In order to improve the efficiency of capital market, to attract foreign capital, and to enhance corporate governance, China government implemented the split share structure reform in 2005. From shareholder dividend preferences and tunneling perspectives, this paper explores the effects of the split share structure reform in China on cash dividend payout.
    The results show that the cash dividend payment decreases significantly after the split share structure reform because the reform mitigates the problem that controlling shareholders mainly holding majority of non-tradable shares would use cash dividends to engage in tunneling. That is, the type Ⅱ agency problem is mitigated. Moreover, as to the corporate governance mechanism, the increases of tradable shares and foreign ownership after split share structure reform are the main reasons to decrease type Ⅱ agency problem. Finally, this study also examines the effects of split share structure reform on four types of companies respectively. The result shows that split share structure reform could mitigate the type Ⅰ and type Ⅱ agency problems, especially in the legal-person owned companies.

    中文提要.....................................................................................................................i 英文提要....................................................................................................................ii 謝誌…………………………………………………………………………………iii 目錄............................................................................................................................iv 表目錄……………………………………………………………………………....vi 第壹章 緒論……………………………………………………………………….1 第貳章 文獻探討………………………………………………………………….5 2.1 股利政策相關文獻……………………………………………………….5 2.1.1 自由現金流量假說……………………………………………….5 2.1.2 股利偏好假說…………………………………………………….5 2.1.3 利益輸送假說…………………………………………………….6 2.2 大陸資本市場特性……………………………………………………….6 2.2.1 中國股權集中度………………………………………………….6 2.2.2 中國金融市場的特性…………………………………………….7 2.2.3 型一代理問題…………………………………………………….7 2.2.4 型二代理問題…………………………………………………….9 2.3 股權分置與改革………………………………………………………….10 2.3.1 股權分置的源由………………………………………………….10 2.3.2 股權分置和股利偏好…………………………………………….10 2.3.3 股權分置的缺點和改革………………………………………….11 2.3.4 股權分置改革對公司治理的影響……………………………….12 第參章 研究假說與研究設計…………………………………………………….15 3.1 研究假說…………………………………………………………………15 3.1.1 股權分置改革v.s.現金股利發放………………………………...15 3.1.2 股權分置改革v.s.型二代理問題………………………………...17 3.1.3 股權分置改革v.s.公司治理……………………………………...17 3.2 資料來源以及樣本選擇…………………………………………………20 3.3 研究設計與變數定義……………………………………………………21 3.3.1 實證方法………………………………………………………….21 3.3.2 研究模型………………………………………………………….21 3.3.3 模型之主要變數………………………………………………….24 3.3.4 模型之控制變數………………………………………………….26 第肆章 實驗結果與分析………………………………………………………….28 4.1 樣本敘述統計……………………………………………………………28 4.2 實證結果…………………………………………………………………36 4.2.1 股權分置改革前後現金股利發放的差異和股利偏好的改變….36 4.2.2 股權分置改革前後型一和型二代理問題與現金股利間關係之變 化………………………………………………………………….39 4.2.3 股權分置改革前後公司治理強度的變化以及對型二代理問題影 響的改變………………………………………………………….44 4.3 穩健性測試………………………………………………………………48 4.3.1 控制股權分置改革過渡時期…………………………………….48 4.3.2 考量外資開放時期……………………………………………….51 4.3.3 其他現金股利發放變數………………………………………….54 第伍章 結論……………………………………………………………………….57 參考文獻………………………………………………………………………….....59

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